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Roads and bridges, as aspects of transportation that are at the center of critical 
infrastructure (CI), are central to evacuation and to emergency response. New York City 
CI needs an accountability and communication model to ensure future progress, focusing 
on maintenance and prioritized improvement. This thesis focuses on how a performance 
measurement system, such as the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) CompStat 
model, will improve and protect the critical infrastructure of New York City’s roads and 
bridges. The author uses over 20 years of NYPD managerial experience to demonstrate 
the successes of the NYPD’s CompStat program through its 22-year history and how 
those successes can be translated to improvement in accountability and communications 
in road and bridge construction and reconstruction. This thesis investigates CI issues, and 
multiple sample events demonstrate how using the CompStat model would have resulted 
in a different outcome. I make the recommendation to create a New York City Mayor’s 
Office of Infrastructure using New York City Emergency Management’s Emergency 
Support Functions (ESF) as a method of grouping agencies and private companies 
together to engage in pre-event non-emergency multi-agency conversations. 
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Critical infrastructure (CI) comprises the assets and networks that assist in energy, 
health, defense, transportation, and other areas to promote an interconnected network of 
utilities and services. These assets must be monitored and improved in a prioritized 
manner to ensure proper working order and appropriate use of tax revenue designated to 
maintain those assets. This thesis explores implementation of a proven accountability 
system into the discipline of critical infrastructure to ensure communication, 
collaboration, and prioritization. 
The CI discussed in this report is more than the ratings of potholes, roadway 
conditions, and bridges. CI conditions relate directly to Homeland Security concerns via 
evacuations during terror attacks or natural disasters as well as emergency response to 
those attacks and disasters or routine police, fire, and medical emergencies. The simple 
truth is that poor roadway conditions and construction projects slow down emergency 
vehicles during routine responses; a major catastrophe would result in substantially 
increased response times and, potentially, more lives lost.  
The United States has a major problem with failing CI. This thesis examines a 
potential solution involving both real fixes in New York City (NYC) and also a planned 
system of accountability and communication that will enable that solution to become 
reality, possibly serving as a model for other U.S. cities. CI will continue to disintegrate 
without significant investment, and a proper system will ensure those investments go to 
best use in best practices. This thesis describes the federal system for CI beginning with 
federal orders and continuing through government critiques by the Congressional 
Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, and RAND—a nonprofit think-
tank. However, when looking for specific research regarding municipal CI in New York 
City, the government review and oversight literature becomes nearly nonexistent. Any 
critiques found come from think-tank organizations and politicians in state and city 
government, rather than federal legislators or policy analysts. This thesis explores the gap 
between current system status and future improvements, and how to improve 
 xvi 
functionality and accountability of agencies performing repairs and improvements of 
Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR). 
This thesis contains sample events taken from local media sources, elected 
officials’ reports, and personal observation, all of which demonstrate the severe effects of 
lack of communication between city agencies, including poor repairs, wasted taxpayer 
money, and delays in substantial genuine improvement to critical infrastructure. The goal 
of listing these sample events is to identify the need for pre-event, pre-construction 
communication to determine a correct course of action and ensuring this communication 
assists in developing and testing any post-event plans necessary in cases of evacuation 
and emergency response. 
The transportation booms of the New Deal in 1933 and the interstate highway 
system in the 1950s have deteriorated to an unsafe condition infrastructure. What would a 
new New Deal investment look like for NYC CI, and how can accountability ensure 
improvement without waste? 
An accountability system is needed to ensure agencies performing improvement 
and repair work to CIKR are working collaboratively and in a prioritized manner to 
provide protection and practical improvements. With so many different agencies, 
difficulties arise in accountability methods and are further complicated by necessary 
cooperation between different partners. 
A system to promote communication and cooperation would address the 
prioritization of CI repairs and improvements. Homeland Security depends on CI to move 
people, products, and emergency equipment. Without proper functionality, a limit to 
improvements in CI will continue, due to the lack of government oversight, inadequate 
evacuation plans, lack of collaboration between city agencies and private entities, and 
shifting populations. The system of accountability recommended in this thesis requires 
private companies to be held accountable for inadequate work and communication to be 
established between city agencies and private companies. 
CompStat is a crime reduction strategy employed by the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) since 1994 that has significantly reduced crime in NYC while 
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encouraging communication-enhancing accountability. With more than two decades of 
experience in the NYPD, 16 as a supervisor, and more than 13 years attending and 
presenting at CompStat, the author examines whether the NYPD CompStat model or a 
similar model would greatly enable the rebuilding and re-envisioning of CI.  
The Mayor’s Office of Operations is tasked with rating city agencies and 
publishing their findings. It is overburdened and unable to monitor CI improvements 
adequately by fostering pre-event frequent periodic communication. This thesis 
recommends that the mayor’s office prioritize CI by creating the NYC Mayor’s Office of 
Infrastructure, and that the Office of Infrastructure implement a CompStat model to 
ensure CI fixes, by building on the existing Office of Operations Infrastructure theme, 
using NYC’s Emergency Management Emergency Support Functions to group agencies. 
Adapting the NYPD’s model of CompStat to CI improvement and protection will create a 
system of communication, accountability, and interagency collaboration. The application 
of CompStat principles and how they can be applied to CI protection and improvement is 
vital to this thesis topic. 
The recommendations in this thesis are simple: New York City government must 
make agencies more interwoven in their responsibilities. The examples relate to city 
agencies entrusted with CI. The systems proposed should begin with those and expand to 
all disciplines. Currently, agencies track efforts on an individual, agency-based, silo-
driven system. The proposed system for the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure and the 
CompStat Unit recommended within accomplishes three missions at once: increase 
accountability, improve communication, and promote inter-agency collaboration. 
By bringing together principles from three city agencies—the Mayor’s Office of 
Operations Infrastructure theme, NYC Emergency Management’s Emergency Support 
Functions, and the NYPD’s CompStat model of accountability, the new Mayor’s Office 
of Infrastructure can promote and monitor communication and collaboration between 
agencies and private companies.  
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The United States has a major problem with failing critical infrastructure (CI). This 
thesis examines a potential solution involving both real fixes in New York City (NYC) and 
also a planned system of accountability and communication that will enable that solution to 
become reality, possibly serving as a model for other U.S. cities. With more than two 
decades of experience in the New York City Police Department (NYPD), 16 as a 
supervisor, and more than 13 years attending and presenting at CompStat (a NYPD 
program stressing accountability and communication), the author examines whether the 
current CompStat or a similar model would greatly enable the rebuilding and re-
envisioning of CI.  
CI is more than the ratings of potholes, roadway conditions, and bridges. CI 
conditions relate directly to Homeland Security concerns via evacuations during terror 
attacks or natural disasters as well as emergency response to those attacks, disasters, or 
routine police, fire, and medical emergencies. What would a new New Deal investment 
look like for NYC CI, and how can accountability ensure improvement without waste? 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How well would a performance measurement system, such as the NYPD’s 
CompStat model, improve and protect CI, specifically NYC’s 6,145 miles of roads, of 
which 43 percent are deficient1 and over 2,000 bridges, of which 20 percent are deficient?2 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines CI as “assets, systems, and 
networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their 
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,” as well 
                                                 
1 “Highway Mileage Report 2014,” New York State Department of Transportation, accessed October 
8, 2016, https://www.dot.ny.gov/highway-data-services. 
2 “Bridges,” New York City Department of Transportation, accessed October 8, 2016, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/infrastructure/bridges.shtml. 
 2 
as the “essential services that underpin American society and serve as the backbone of 
our nation’s economy, security, and health.”3 
Major CI failures, such as the I-35 Bridge collapse in Minnesota in 2007, shown in 
Figure 1, which killed 13 people and injured 145,4 demonstrate the dangers of continuing 
to neglect bridges and roadways and therefore the necessity to improve CI. The I-35 Bridge 
was built as part of the U.S. highway system boom that occurred in the 1960s. Another 
failing CI example is the Skagit River Bridge in Mount Vernon, Washington, which 
collapsed in 2013 after a truck struck a section of the bridge, as shown in Figure 2.5 The I-
35 and Skagit collapses represent the possible fate of 70,000+ deficient bridges in the 
United States,6 many of which date to the 1930s.  
Figure 1. I-35 Bridge Collapse7 
 
Photo credit: Kevin Rofidal, United States Coast Guard 
                                                 
3 “What Is Critical Infrastructure?” Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 28, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure. 
4 S. Hao, “I-35W Bridge Collapse,” Journal of Bridge Engineering 15, no. 5 (2009): 608. 
5 Jeffrey L. Horton, “Surviving an Interstate Bridge Collapse,” Public Roads 78, no. 3 (2014). https://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/14novdec/05.cfm. 
6 “Falling Apart: America’s Neglected Infrastructure.” CBS News. Accessed April 5, 2016. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/falling-apart-america-neglected-infrastructure/. 





Figure 2. Skagit River Bridge Collapse8 
 
Photo credit: Sarah Aarthun 
These collapses are indicative of outdated physical structures as well as a lack of 
systems to fix those structures. There is an immediate need to monitor the unattended 
deterioration and lack of accountability and prioritization in the CI system. The United 
States needs direct investment in CI and in the human communication and accountability 
training that will enable real and lasting improvements. 
The need for emergency response to an incident, regardless of its size, is less 
frequently considered a connection between Homeland Security and CI, but it is 
nonetheless crucial. Examples of the relationship between CI and Homeland Security 
include an ambulance getting to a sick or injured person, a fire truck going to a residential 
fire, a police car responding to a victim, or a mass mobilization of all of these resources 
combined in cases of large-scale attacks or natural disasters. The simple truth is that poor 
roadway conditions and construction projects slow down emergency vehicles during 
routine responses; a major catastrophe would result in substantially increased response 
times and, potentially, more lives lost.  
Roads and bridges all over the United States are outdated, impaired, and 
documented as inferior by civil engineers, research groups, and transportation agencies, 
but improvement models have not been implemented. The U.S. transportation 
                                                 
8 Source: “Washington Bridge Collapses,” CNN, May 26, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/24/us/
gallery/skagit-river-bridge/index.html. 
 4 
infrastructure boom had two phases. The first was part of President Roosevelt’s New 
Deal (1933) to help the country recover from the Great Depression. The second was in 
the 1950s and 1960s, when the establishment of the nation’s interstate highway system 
connected the country.9 The roads and bridges constructed were not intended for use as 
long as they have been in service; 84 years since the New Deal and 66 years from the 
highway system expansion, respectively. Traffic volume, as well as vehicular weights, 
have increased exponentially. Current estimates by the Congressional Budget Office state 
that $20 billion a year is needed to maintain CI’s current inadequate levels or $80 billion 
a year to show positive advances.10 
The ratings in Table 1 indicate major CI failures, ultimately resulting in damage 
and loss of life. The literature review in Chapter II includes federal CI protection plans 
generated by the DHS and analyses of those plans and processes by organizations such as 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Governmental Accountability Office (GAO), 
and RAND Corporation. This literature documents the lack of follow-up and 
accountability in CI protection and improvement. American Society of Civil Engineer 
(ASCE) reports, such as those used to generate the information included in Table 1, 
document the dangerously poor state of roads and bridges both nationally and locally.  
  
                                                 
9 “America’s Crumbling Infrastructure: Bridging the Gap,” Business Insider, June 29, 2014, accessed 
May 22, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-crumbling-infrastructure-bridging-the-gap-2014–
6 
10 “America’s Transport Infrastructure: Life in the Slow Lane,” The Economist, April 28, 2011, 
accessed May 22, 2016. http://www.economist.com/node/18620944. 
 5 













 2009 201315 201516 2010 2014 2016 2012 
Energy D+ D+   C C  
Transit D D C D- D D C 
Ports  C   C+  B 
Aviation D D C     
Levees D- D-   C- D-  
Dams D D C- C- C-  B- 
Schools D D  B- C- C-  
Roads D- D D- D- D- D+ C- 
Inland 
Waterways 
D- D-  D+ D+   
Wastewater D- D D D+ D- C+ B+ 
Hazardous 
Waste 
D D   B-   
Public 
Recreation 
C- C- B- B- B- C+  
Rail  C- C+  B B B-  
Bridges C C+ D+ C D+ B- C 
Solid Waste C+ B- B- B- C+ C+ B+ 
Drinking Water D- D C D+ D C+ C 
Storm Water    D- D+  B+ 
TOTAL D D+ C-     
 
                                                 
11 “Report Card for America’s Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009, accessed 
December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/2009/sites/default/files/
RC2009_full_report.pdf. 
12 “Report Card for Pennsylvania’s Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013, 
accessed December 28, 2015, http://www.pareportcard.org/. 
13 “Report Card for Washington DC’s Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2016, 
accessed February 15, 2016, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASCE-
DC-Report-Card-2016-Report.pdf 
14 “Report Card for Los Angeles County Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2012, 
accessed December 28, 2015,http://s247942916.onlinehome.us/pdf/2012-ASCE-Report%20Card-Revised-
10-2-2012-REVISED_FINAL_FOR%20THE%20WEBSITE.pdf 
15 “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013, accessed 
December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/asce-news/new-york-infrastructure-receives-
report-card/. 
16 “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2015, accessed 
December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/new_york/newyork/. 
 6 
Table 1, based on the American Society of Civil Engineers’ “Report Card for 
America’s Infrastructure” as well as the ASCE’s regional reports, shows the only reviews 
of CI that document nationwide conditions and demonstrate the current realities of U.S. 
CI. It shows the nation’s current CI rating by an independent agency, and can be used as 
a guideline for improvements. The low grades represent the need for improvement. The 
table also documents that New York City’s roads rate lower or worse than its bridges.17 
These examples of CI failure and listed deficiencies are indicators of future issues that 
need an immediate solution. Report cards assess the situation, but the outcome must be to 
prioritize solutions. 
Figure 3. NYC Roadway18 
 
Photo credit Chad Rachman 
 
Poor roadways, created by inadequate upkeep, cost taxpayers in both tax dollars 
and private money spent on auto repairs. Odometer.com’s article “20 Cities with the 
WORST Roads,” rates New York City’s roads as 6th of 20 of the worst roads in the 
                                                 
17 “Report Card for New York’s Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013, accessed 
December 28, 2015, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/
NY_ReportCard_FullReport_9.29.15_FINAL.pdf. 
18 “NYC Is Pothole City,” New York Post, March 19, 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/03/19/new-york-
city-is-one-big-pothole/. 
 7 
United States, costing an average of $2,300 per year per motorist for auto repairs of 
which 74 percent of the roads are in either mediocre or poor condition.19 Lucius Riccio, a 
researcher with Columbia University’s Data Science Institute, states that “chronic 
underfunding of road repairs for nearly 20 years left city streets in poor shape and thus, 
prone to potholes,”20 and “80 percent of potholes are due to inadequate resurfacing,”21 
further demonstrating that a solution to CI issues of accountability and pre-event 
communication will avoid these inadequacies.  
The homeland security enterprise must assist in the strategic foresight needed to 
improve upon critical infrastructure key resources (CIKR) in a prioritized, successful, and 
cost-effective manner that ensures accountability. The effect of CI failures on Homeland 
Security is multi-faceted. Homeland Security serves to protect CIKR, such as bridges, 
roadways, transportation centers (airports, train stations, and bus stations), and also cyber 
assets, where vital information is often stored and transferred. Part of that CI protection 
responsibility necessitates an attack deterrence framework. 
CI will continue to disintegrate without significant investment, and a proper 
system will ensure those investments go to best use in best practices. CI is increasingly in 
danger of destruction by natural or accidental causes or a terrorist attack.22 Components 
of CI are also not self-contained; they overlap and impact one another and affect different 
services. Santos, Haimes, and Lian are CI researchers who write, “in order to ensure the 
stability, sustainability, and operability of our critical economic and infrastructure 
sectors, it is imperative to understand their inherent physical and economic linkages, in 
addition to their cyber interdependencies.”23 These interdependencies can create 
                                                 
19 “20 Cities with the Worst roads,” Odometer, retrieved September 29, 2016, 
http://www.odometer.com/lifestyle/4672/20-cities-with-the-worst-roads/#page=6. 
20 Lucius Riccio, “Applying Data Science to the War on Potholes,” Columbia University Data Science 
Institute, March 15, 2016, http://datascience.columbia.edu/applying-data-science-war-potholes. 
21 Ibid. 
22 According to the 2013 American Society of Civil Engineers Report Card for America’s 
Infrastructure, the current rating is a D+ with an estimated $3.6 billion dollars needed to be invested by the 
year 2020. 
23 Joost R. Santos, Yacov Y. Haimes and Chenyang Lian, “A Framework for Linking Cybersecurity 
Metrics to the Modeling of Macroeconomic Interdependencies,” Risk Analysis 27, no. 5 (2007): 1283. 
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obstacles to improvement, but the system proposed in this thesis uses CI’s interconnected 
nature to group infrastructure aspects into a forum promoting communication. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
An accountability system is needed to ensure agencies performing improvement 
and repair work to CIKR are working collaboratively and in a prioritized manner to 
provide protection and practical improvements. With so many different agencies, 
difficulties arise in accountability methods and are further complicated by necessary 
cooperation between different partners. CIKR is currently owned and managed by a 
combination of federal, state, and municipal entities as well as private corporations. Some 
difficulties are getting these partners to unite, agree, and work together due to 
stakeholders’ diverse interests. Also, currently, the federal government has no regulatory 
authority over private industry. As such, there is no way to oversee these exchanges. The 
accountability system needs to be non-adversarial and to encourage free conversation,24 
and the system also cannot be punitive.25 
Applying an effective CI communication and accountability model similar to the 
NYPD’s CompStat program would increase the performance of agencies and assist in 
emergency response and evacuation procedures. The NYPD’s CompStat program, which 
revolutionized the way law enforcement agencies work and created safer cities across the 
country, is a crime reduction program that began in New York City in 1994. The model is 
twofold, with accountability being the focus and addressing quality-of-life crimes as a 
component. The theory is to address smaller crimes in an area before larger crimes occur. 
The correlation holds true in CI, where we could address minor concerns before they 
become larger. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) tracks crimes nationwide 
utilizing a Unified Crime Report classification guide, which ensures different 
jurisdictions are tracking the same types of crimes (index crimes) regardless of what a 
                                                 
24 Robert D. Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat: Or What Are the Key Strategic Choices That a 
Jurisdiction or Agency Must Make When Adapting the Compstat/Citistat Class of Performance 
Strategies?” Public Performance & Management Review 32, no. 2 (2008): 218. 
25 James J. Willis, David Weisburd, and Stephen D. Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth 
Analysis of Three Cities (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2003). 
 9 
jurisdiction names that crime.26 When created, CompStat used these index crimes to 
focus resources and prioritize the New York City Police Department’s mission. Since its 
inception in the NYPD, CompStat produced a 77.4 percent decrease in index crimes, 
including an 85 percent reduction in homicides.27 The original NYPD CompStat 
principles are accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment, and 
relentless follow-up and assessment.28  
The author uses his Compstat experience of witnessing the principles, procedures, 
and policies and compares that experience to academic articles regarding CompStat to 
posit potential CI applications, including the creation of the Mayor’s Office of 
Infrastructure. The personal knowledge and expertise are coupled with available research 
to demonstrate the success of the NYPD’s CompStat program, similar programs in other 
cities, and programs in other disciplines modeled after the NYPD.  
This thesis recommends the use of a proven performance management style, 
CompStat, into a discipline that requires communication and accountability measurement 
for improvement. The author’s experience forms the basis to apply the CompStat 
principles to CI protection and improvement as follows:  
• Early collection of issues to be addressed 
• Multi-agency collaboration 
• Prioritized workload  
• Post-event or post-improvement critiques 
This thesis also explores the gap between what has been done and what needs to 
be done to fix New York City’s CI. Topics discussed cover how to improve the 
functionality, communication, and accountability of agencies performing repairs and 
improvements of CI. The research draws a conclusion between what RAND, the GAO, 
                                                 
26 “Unified Crime Report.” Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved May 8, 2016. 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. 
27 “Compstat 2.0.” New York City Police Department. Retrieved May 7, 2016. 
https://Compstat.nypdonline.org/. 
28 Jeff Godown. “The Compstat Process: Four Principles for Managing Crime Reduction.” The Police 
Chief 76, no. 8 (2009): 36–38. 
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and the CRS state the federal government needs to do to correct CI nationally and applies 
that conclusion to the same CI areas in NYC. The anticipated outcome is the effect that 
applying CompStat principles will have in CI protection and improvement projects as 
well as a projection of how these principles will affect future projects. 
The New York State Office of Emergency Management (NYS OEM), particularly 
the Office of Counter Terrorism, oversees the NYS system of CI protection and 
improvement but, contrary to the federal system, there are no outside entities analyzing the 
NYC system. This thesis’ research shows inadequate oversight at the local NYC level. 
The NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations “monitors the performance of all City 
agencies, holding each agency accountable for providing high quality services and making 
data about the City’s performance readily available to the public.”29 Their website uses 
numerous indicators to detail agencies’ performance. The NYC Mayor’s Office of 
Operations provides this information via the Citywide Performance Reporting (CPR) 
tool.30 The CPR tool assigns similar aspects of all city agencies to eight citywide themes, 
including Public Safety, Legal Affairs, Education, and Infrastructure. The Infrastructure 
theme consists of reports on city agencies tasked with infrastructure but the Mayor’s Office 
of Operations does not define collaboration, coordination, or accountability and it does not 
encourage participation of private companies. The word “theme” implies a lack of 
accountability and a change to the Office of Infrastructure promotes responsibility. 
NYC Emergency Management (EM) “plans and prepares for emergencies, educates 
the public about preparedness, coordinates emergency response, and recovery, and collects 
and disseminates emergency information.”31 City agencies and private companies working 
in the same disciplines are combined into EM’s emergency support functions (ESF) model 
for post-event repairs and mitigation. This thesis recommends creating an office of the 
Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure (DMI), using EM’s ESF model of combining city agencies 
                                                 
29 “Mission,” NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations, retrieved October 15, 2016, http://www1.nyc.gov/
site/operations/about/about.page 
30 “CPR: Agency Performance Reporting,” New York City Mayor’s Office, retrieved October 15, 
2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/cpr/html/home/home.shtml. 
31 “Overview,” New York City Emergency Management, August 19, 2016, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/
em/about/overview.page 
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and private companies to increase communication among all partners in NYC CI. 
Combining these models, in addition to implementing a CompStat unit within the Deputy 
Mayor of Infrastructure’s office, fosters an accountability model to CI improvements. 
Moving Infrastructure from a sub-unit of the Mayor’s Office of Operations into its own 
agency will show the dedication the mayor has to improving CI for all New Yorkers, as 
well as demanding accountability of the agencies responsible for NYC’s CI. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To demonstrate the need for an accountability and communication model in CI, 
Chapter II provides a literature review, examining government documents and academic 
works on CI and its current state. Next, Chapter III reviews think-tank organizations and 
engineering groups’ ratings of CI by detailing causation of road conditions and future 
investment needed. Then, Chapter IV lists seven sample events of CI issues and city 
agencies’ lack of communication and accountability. These events are collected from 
seminars presented by local elected officials, local media sources, and personal 
observation. Chapter V presents a detailed overview of the NYPD’s CompStat model and 
similar models, not only focusing on successes but also listing critiques and limitations. 
Then, Chapter VI analyzes the methodology of implementing the CompStat model into CI, 
including structure of the office designated to monitor agencies’ progress. Lastly, Chapter 
VII concludes the thesis by stressing the benefits of conducting a CompStat system and the 
importance of communication, accountability, and monitored improvement in NYC CI by 
creating the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter I reviewed failing critical infrastructure in the United States and 
hypothesized a solution for NYC. Although grades and rating systems indicate that most 
aspects of CI in NYC need work, this thesis focuses on NYC roads and bridges and 
improving them through the NYPD’s CompStat model. Chapter II reviews literature 
regarding CI, beginning with government documents and critiques of those documents. 
Next, the chapter reviews literature on CompStat, including both negative and positive 
aspects, followed by literature on the current state of CI by think tank organizations. 
A. BACKGROUND ON CI POLICY AND PROGRESS 
Due to the lack of government plans and overwhelming number of critiques of 
road and bridge conditions in New York City, this thesis compares CI on a regional level 
to that on a national level. The thesis first examines the plans, policies, and goals issued 
by the federal government regarding critical infrastructure protection. Next we explore 
the critique of those policies and plans, then examine descriptions and criticisms of 
CompStat, and finally discuss the need of New York City roadways to be maintained and 
improved in a more efficient manner. Even though the government produces many 
reports regarding improvements to CI, and federal agencies tasked with reviewing these 
reports have chronicled the failures of agencies, little literature exists on how to fix CI. 
Are there current accountability methods, measurement systems, or metrics in 
place to ensure productive, priority-based protection and improvement to CIKR? 
Research says not yet. Reviews by the GAO, RAND, and CRS all recommend 
implementation of a better form of metrics. These reports ask one question: How is DHS 
tracking improvements made in disaster preparedness? These reports address the lack of 
DHS (and sub-agencies) measuring successes, tracking improvements, and monitoring 
the results of their published goals. The system recommended in this thesis will create a 
communication model and an accountability aspect to ensure correct follow-up. 
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1. Government Directives Regarding CI 
Government documents, such as plans, guidelines, goals, and after-action plans, 
have examined CI issues since at least the early 1990s, and have included the creation of 
Executive Orders and Presidential Policy Directives. When we think of homeland 
security, we may think of the post-9/11 world, but the orders, especially as they relate to 
CI, date further back. 
In 1996, President Clinton issued orders to monitor, improve, share and analyze 
information regarding CI. Executive Order 13010, published by President Clinton on July 
15, 1996, established the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
tasked to recommend a national policy and strategy to protect CI from physical and cyber 
threats.32 This order is the first to mention partnerships between the public and private 
sectors. Presidential Decision Directive 63, issued by President Clinton in 1998, created 
information sharing and analysis centers to allow the government and critical 
infrastructure owners (city, state, and federal agencies and private companies that own CI 
components) to consult with each other.33 
President Bush issued Executive Orders to create DHS and to establish “establish 
readiness metrics to measure progress.”34 These readiness metrics were never specified, 
and the federal government did not follow up to ensure the establishment of metrics. 
Executive Order 13228, issued in 2001, created the Office of Homeland Security.35 
Executive Order 13231 of 2001 includes the Congressional Approval of DHS.36 The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security as an 
                                                 
32 William Jefferson Clinton, “Executive Order 13010—Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Federal 
Register 61, no. 138 (1996): 37347–37350. 
33 William Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (Washington, DC: The White House, 1998). 
34 George W. Bush. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8. 17 December 
2003.” Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. Accessed March 11, 2016, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217–7. Html. 
35 George W. Bush, “Executive Order 13228: Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the 
Homeland Security Council,” Federal Register 66, no. 196 (October 10, 2001): 51812–51817.  
36 George W. Bush, “Executive Order 13231: Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information 
Age,” Federal Register 66, no. 202 (October 18, 2001): 53063–53071.  
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Executive Department with the mission of preventing terrorism within the United 
States.37 
President Bush also issued orders to bolster CI and to measure improvements. The 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-7 signed on December 17, 2003, 
“requires federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and protect” U.S. CI 
assets.38 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8, issued at the same time, 
developed the goal of organizing national efforts and investments to strengthen 
preparedness and to “establish readiness metrics to measure progress.”39 Again, these 
readiness metrics were never specified, and the federal government did not follow up to 
ensure the establishment of metrics.  
Methods of threat assessment were introduced in orders issued by President 
Obama in 2011. HSPD-8 created the National Preparedness Guidelines and the National 
Preparedness System.40 This system identifies practices that would be used to generate 
the National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness Report, such as the Threat 
and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) and the 31 Core Capabilities that 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) utilizes. On February 12, 2013, 
President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 21, which created the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan.41 
Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
requires the publication of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) every 
four years.42 The first version, published in 2010, describes how events after 9/11 and the 
                                                 
37 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
38 George W. Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7): Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 39, no. 51 
(December 22, 2003): 1816–1822. 
39 Bush. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8. 17 December 2003.” 
40 “Homeland Security Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness,” White House, December 17, 2003. 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm. 
41 Barack Obama. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (Washington, DC: White House, 2013). 
42 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 
266 (2007). 
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creation of DHS showed the need for links between homeland security and other 
functions, such as securing borders, managing immigration, and critical infrastructure. 
The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review builds on the 2010 report as well as 
critiques of that report. The 2014 version states DHS will adopt strategic shifts and renew 
emphasis on strengthening the execution of DHS’s mission through public–private 
partnerships.43 Based on reviews by GAO, CRS, and RAND, the QHSR and HSPD-8 
require that metrics be developed, yet never gave the format to be used to formulate or 
institute those metrics. 
2. Evaluations of Government CI Efforts 
Government monitoring groups, such as RAND, the CRS, and the GAO, also 
produce reports on CI. Most of these reports regard how DHS (and sub-agencies) have 
lacked measuring successes, tracking improvements, and monitoring results of their 
declared goals.  
Even though the government produces reports regarding improvements made to 
CI and the federal agencies tasked with reviewing these documents issue reports on the 
failures of agencies, there is little literature on how to specifically fix that disconnect. 
DHS produces documents such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the 
National Preparedness Report while the GAO and CRS indicate a lack of progress. The 
cycle of failures continues as GAO and CRS reports call for DHS to develop metrics, but 
they do not provide guidance or advice as to what kind of metrics to develop or how to 
implement those metrics. Twenty years later, specifics are more necessary than ever, and 
NYC has an opportunity to build on CompStat and lead the country. 
Multiple reports issued by the GAO address a lack of initiative by DHS in 
advancement of CI monitoring. A 2011 GAO report documents failures by FEMA, 
including seven different previously discussed efforts and recommendations that had not 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
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been implemented.44 The report states the following regarding measurable performance 
indicators:  
Thus, identifying measurable performance indicators could help FEMA 
(1) track progress toward established goals, (2) provide policy makers 
with the information they need to make rational resource allocations, and 
(3) provide program managers with the data needed to effect continual 
improvements, measure progress, and to enforce accountability.45 
GAO issued reports documenting failures, but the recommendations were not 
followed and CI continues to deteriorate. This thesis describes a performance 
management and accountability model employing those indicators, allocations, data, and 
measured progress for positive efforts. 
In 2013, GAO issued a report as a follow up to the 2009 report on deteriorating 
CI.46 The newer report states: “in April 2009, we reported that establishing quantifiable 
metrics for capabilities was a prerequisite to developing assessment data that can be 
compared across all levels of government.”47 A 2014 GAO report details the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS.48 The NPPD is responsible for 
leading the coordinated effort and partnership between the sector-specific agencies and the 
private sector. In 2011, the Senate Committee on Appropriations directed that the NPPD 
report to the Committee within 60 days to outline efforts made in improvements, including 
implementing performance metrics.49 The GAO failed to provide instruction in the 
development of and implementation of performance metrics. In August 2013, the DHS 
                                                 
44 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made 
Limited Progress in Assessing National Capabilities (GAO-11-260) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2011), 2, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11260t.pdf. 
45 Ibid. 
46 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but 
Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities. (GAO-13-637T) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013): 8, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
13-637T. 
47 Ibid. 
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure: Assessment of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Report on the Results of Its Critical Infrastructure Partnership Streamlining Efforts 
(GAO-14-100R) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-14-100R. 
49 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Preparedness, 8. 
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responded with a report that failed to address the points made by the Senate Committee. 
The reports written from 2009 until 2014, state that more must be done to define and 
implement measurement performance metrics. The latter reports indicate that those metrics 
were never developed, yet still do not recommend how to do so. 
More recent releases by the GAO highlight the difficulties in the partnership 
program between sector-specific agencies and the private sector but also list the failures 
of private industry to cooperate.50 Another 2014 report focuses on the difficulty in 
assessing CI risks due to the different assessment tools and methods used.51 A review by 
the GAO shows that DHS is unable to integrate vulnerability assessments due to different 
agencies using different tools to measure different aspects of CI. For example, a 2015 
GAO report on electromagnetic threats covers a wide array of issues with the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan’s establishment of the sector-specific Agencies and the 
necessary partnership agreement.52 Recommendations state that “testing standards and 
measurable improvement metrics should be defined as early as possible and kept up to 
date.”53 
This section documented a consistent lack in specifics over a period of more than 
two decades despite recurring recommendations of the need for metrics. The next section 
explores the recommendations of GAO and incorporates them into a NYC model of 
accountability and communication based on the CompStat principles, positing an 
adaption of CompStat as a means to generate specific fixes and metrics. 
                                                 
50 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on Key 
Factors in DHS’s Implementation of its Partnership Approach (GAO 14-464) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-464T 
51 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to 
Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts (GAO 14-507) (Washington, 
DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-507. 
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary 
Observations on DHS Efforts to Address Electromagnetic Threats to the Electric Grid. (GAO-15-692) 





There is a wealth of literature on CompStat starting with the launch of the 
program in New York City in 1994, and this literature can be expected to increase as 
more departments and disciplines attempt to incorporate CompStat-style tools into their 
respective agencies or fields. Most literature examines the development of CompStat and 
the distribution to other police agencies and then to other city agencies. A 1999 study 
revealed that a third of large departments had a “CompStat-like program” and an 
additional 26 percent planned to initiate one.54 
In researching performance metrics, we review the literature regarding general 
performance metrics and then, more specifically, metrics for the NYPD’s CompStat 
program. Performance management researchers credit the creation of CompStat to Police 
Commissioner William Bratton of the NYPD. Some literature states that the ideas started 
with Bratton’s policies in Boston in the late 1980s and early 1990s.55 Academics 
studying CompStat and crime strategies, such as Behn, Willis, and Dabney, have studied 
the successes of CompStat and similar programs. 
Researchers have attempted to identify progress that can be translated into 
performance management. While there is no generally accepted approach yet, computer 
advancement and data collection techniques will improve, but a methodology of how to 
quantify performance in CI improvements and prevention is needed. An article on the 
Homeland Security Today website states that “there is no comprehensive, strategic 
approach to identifying, prioritizing and implementing investments for disaster resilience, 
which increases the risk that the federal government and non-federal partners will 
experience lower returns on investments or lost opportunities to strengthen key Critical 
Infrastructure and lifelines.”56 In 1998, transportation analyst A. C. Lemer stated that 
                                                 
54 Willis, Weisburd, and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities.  
55 Dean Dabney, “Observations regarding Key Operational Realities in a Compstat Model of 
Policing,” Justice Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2010): 28. 
56 Anthony L. Kimery, “FEMA Outlines Decade of Progress after Hurricane Katrina, But Millions in 




“innovative data-collection technologies and increased computational power will enable 
public works asset managers to gain better understanding of infrastructure performance 
and the public’s demand and expectations for its infrastructure.”57 Taquechel and Lewis, 
who have written about how to deter attacks on CI, state that “there is a considerable 
repository of literature offering insights into how deterrence might be quantified, without 
ever explicitly stating how to quantify it for CI protection.”58 Government directives and 
critiques all discuss the need for communication, accountability, and performance 
measurements, but do not specify a method of implementations.  
Literature regarding performance management styles similar to the CompStat 
model include discussions of PerformanceStat, a term coined by Robert Behn to describe 
all of the CompStat-like programs nationwide, most of which incorporate either the 
location or the agency involved; Citistat in Baltimore; ParkStat in the NYC Parks 
Department; and LouieStat in St. Louis.59 Behn points out that any PerformanceStat is 
strategy that should involve regular and frequent meetings, in which a “chief executive 
uses data to analyze past performance, follow up on previous decisions to improve 
performance, establish performance objectives and examine the effectiveness of 
performance strategies.”60 Behn’s earlier literature on performance measurement details 
reasons to measure performance to achieve eight specific managerial purposes. Behn 
states that public agency leaders need to define the purpose of measurement, identify 
specific measures, and put the data obtained to practical use.61 
                                                 
57 A. C. Lemer. “Progress toward Integrated Infrastructure-Assets-Management Systems: GIS and 
Beyond.” In Innovations in Urban Infrastructure Seminar of the APWA International Public Works 
Congress, (Washington, DC: American Public Works Association, 1998): 7. 
58 Eric F. Taquechel, and Ted G. Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical 
Infrastructure Risk,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 12 (August, 2012), accessed March 29, 2016, https://
www.hsaj.org/articles/226.  
59 Behn, “Designing PerformanceStat,” 206. 
60 Ibid., 215 
61 Robert D. Behn, “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures,” 
Public Administration Review 63, no. 5 (2003): 588. 
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Positive reviews of the NYPD CompStat system continuously cite the awards 
won by the NYPD for changing crime fighting techniques.62 In 2001, George Keeling, a 
criminal justice researcher and author, called CompStat “perhaps the single most 
important organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter half of the 
twentieth century.”63 The documented successes of the NYPD’s CompStat program 
depict a vast difference in crime reduction; adapting a CompStat model within the 
Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure is likely to create a medium increase in productivity, 
accountability, communication, and improvement to CI. 
There are also critiques of CompStat. The most repeated idea references the tone 
and design of the meetings and quoted that CompStat can be “punitive” or “brutal.”64 
Due to this, there was an NYPD executive shift by the end of 1994.65 Research yields 
allegations of supervisors downgrading crimes to make crime appear lower.66 In 2009, 
Shelly Metzenbaum stated, “what is needed is a performance management approach that 
is outcome focused, measurement rich, and inquisitive but not punitive.”67 In developing 
an accountability model for CI improvements, the positive and negative aspects of 
CompStat and similar programs must be addressed. 
Behn and Willis give detailed examples of the process of these performance 
meetings, such as why they are needed, when to have, length, frequency, and 
organizational psychology that may exist. There must be a deficit that needs to be 
addressed, and pointing out flaws yields an analysis of what is happening68 as well as 
                                                 
62 The NYPD won the1996 “Innovations in American Government” award, sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. 
63 George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York 
City’s Police Reforms (New York: CCI Center for Civic Innovation at the Manhattan Institute, 2001), 6.  
64 Willis, Weisburd, and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities, 21. 
65 Eli B. Silverman, “Mapping Change: How the New York City Police Department Reengineered 
itself to Drive Down Crime,” Law Enforcement News, December 15, 1996. 
66 Willis, Weisburd and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice, 12. 
67 Shelley H. Metzenbaum, “Performance Management Recommendations for the New 
Administration” (2009). Edward J. Collins Center for Public Management Publications. Paper 11. 4. 
Retrieved on November 8, 2015, http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cpm_pubs/11. 
68 Willis, Weisburd and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice, 7. 
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using this format as a “management tool to influence decisions.”69 Behn also discusses 
the timing of the meetings, early morning as to not interfere with the regular work 
functions of those attending.70 He then describes how the length and frequency of the 
meetings, as well as the room design, are crucial elements in a successful 
PerformanceStat set-up.71 One last point from multiple pieces of literature addresses the 
cultural psychology of professions and occupations. Will various offices adapt to this 
new thinking, tolerate the risk, and encourage new approaches? 
Although the literature reviewed involves the need, history, and critiques of 
CompStat and programs like it, the application of CompStat principles and how they can 
be applied to CI protection and improvement is vital to this thesis topic. The first steps 
are to address the current mission, deficits, and technological framework. Once the 
mission is developed, the data to be analyzed must be shared with all members attending 
the meeting. The subject agency must spread an accurate portrayal of the stat processes, 
missions, and methodologies. Maintaining a professional, productive atmosphere is key 
to ensure a true method for improvement.72  
C. HOW DO WE FIX CI? 
Many studies document the interconnectedness and interdependency of critical 
infrastructure but do not address how to get those connected parts to work more 
efficiently together. Agencies such as RAND, the GAO, and the CRS, concentrate on 
overall assessments of what the federal government is doing correctly or what needs to be 
improved. As such, there is little academic research on smaller-scale locations, such as 
what cities are doing correctly or incorrectly. 
                                                 
69 Jamie Giles. “Do Municipal Stat Programs Improve Services and Reallocate Resources? Evidence 
from LouieStat,” (MPS/MPP Capstone Project, University of Kentucky, 2014), accessed March 29, 2016. 
http://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/4 , 1. 
70 Willis, Weisburd, and Mastrofski, Compstat in Practice, 7. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Paul E. O’Connell, Using Performance Data for Accountability, the New York City Police 
Department’s Compstat Model of Police Management (Arlington, VA: Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
Endowment for the Business of Government, 2001). 
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Experts in the field of CI research determine that increased budgets will be 
required to make necessary improvements, but money must be spent in a prioritized 
manner that is tested and evaluated, continuing future progress based on past 
improvements. In her 2013 work, Mayada Omer, a resilience product development expert 
at the University of Munich, references the need to make transportation systems more 
resilient, which “creates a need for developing metrics that measure the current resilience 
of the system and provides a benchmark for evaluating different strategies for improving 
resilience.”73 
Bruce Shaller is a CI researcher at New York University’s (NYU) Wagner School 
who presented at NYU’s Rudin Center. There, he references the 2010 New York State 
Capital Program for the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) for 
2005 to 2010.74 This program gives $17.4 billion to NYSDOT’s Highway Capital projects, 
$6 billion of which is for the 14 counties of downstate New York, including NYC.75 
Shaller’s research shows that a conservative plan to maintain highways during the reporting 
period, 2005–2010, would cost $9 billion and a more aggressive plan to make 
improvements would be over $13 billion.76  
Transportation analysts Winston and Mannering reported the need to involve 
private industry in improvements to public highway performance, including the 
requirement by law that private industries use the most modern technologies in roadway 
replacement and repair.77 New York City’s PlaNYC, developed by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, references disasters such as Super Storm Sandy and the destruction caused 
by climate change. The report focuses mainly on public transit systems, as opposed to 
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vehicular traffic on roads and bridges, with specific mention of roads and bridges 
considered a moderate risk due to weather-related incidents (precipitation or high heat) as 
opposed to marine traffic and subways being a high risk.78 One cause of concern that the 
report fails to mention is, that once the transit and marine systems fail, already 
overburdened roads and bridges will become overwhelmed. Discussion in Comes’ 2014 
work citing Super Storm Sandy and the ensuing infrastructure shutdown involves a way 
to conceptualize interdependencies.79 
This thesis explores the gap between current system status and future 
improvements, and how to improve functionality and accountability of agencies 
performing repairs and improvements of CIKR. The hypothesis explored in this thesis is 
drawn between what RAND, the GAO, and the CRS state the federal government needs 
to correct and how we can solve a lack of initiative in the same areas in NYC. Chapter III 
addresses CI issues in NYC as reported by think-tank organizations and CI researcher. 
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III. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN NYS AND NYC 
The facilities of infrastructure are among civilization’s most important 
assets, a storehouse of resources and wealth that each generation inherits, 
uses, and passes on to succeeding generations. Decisions influencing 
infrastructure development and use—asset management—undertaken and 
executed without fully recognizing the complexity, diversity, and social 
and technological evolution of the system almost inevitably squander 
economic, environmental, social, and cultural resources. 
—A. C. Lemer80 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II reviewed the literature regarding government plans and critiques of 
critical infrastructure, the successes of CompStat, and the current state of CI. Chapter III 
delves deeper into both NYC and NYS CI, detailing how usage and vehicle ownership 
affects road and bridge conditions. Chapter III also explores the effects of weather and 
emergency incidents on transportation and emergency response, highlighting the 
importance of improving CI in NYC. 
Improving CI is more than just filling in potholes. This thesis describes the federal 
system for CI beginning with federal orders and continuing through government critiques 
by the CRS, the GAO, and RAND. However, as previously noted, when looking for 
specific research regarding municipal CI in New York City, the government review and 
oversight literature becomes nearly nonexistent. Any critiques found come from think-
tank organizations and politicians in state and city government, rather than federal 
legislators or policy analysts. This chapter includes issues in New York City critical 
infrastructure as related by the United States Department of Homeland Security, the New 
York City Department of Transportation, New York State Division of Homeland Security 
plan, and private transportation firm ratings statewide. This thesis reviews current New 
York City roadway issues as reported by the Center for an Urban Future, the Rudin 
Center for Transportation, and the New York City government. The information cited 
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from research organizations replaces the lack of governmental review and creates the 
accurate intelligence principle of the CompStat process. This thesis recommends a 
formation of the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure (DMI) and a CompStat unit 
therein to monitor CI agencies. The following research investigates whether roadway 
construction and repair can influence commuting, safety, finance, and evacuation, and 
increase communication and accountability in city agencies. 
Work conducted collecting intelligence regarding CI is useless when there is no 
measurability, and those responsible are not held accountable. As A. C. Lemer, a 
transportation analyst who created the Integrated Infrastructure Management System 
(IIMS) states in his 1998 report, “the inefficiencies are widespread and easy to see: 
jammed traffic on roads designed to carry only a fraction of the current demand, newly 
resurfaced city streets ripped open to repair old subsurface pipes, news media expressing 
public outrage that traffic lanes must be closed for maintenance or that basements are 
flooded.”81 Lemer’s flowchart shows a process for infrastructure management, yet only 
small parts of each step involve accountability, as depicted in Table 2. To learn from the 
intelligence collection process, management must accurately compare intelligence 
collected versus previous reports or scenarios and advance from the information. 
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Table 2. Conceptual Model of an Integrated Infrastructure 
Management System82 
 
The chart in Table 2 depicts a cycle of intelligence collection similar to the 
CompStat process principles described in this thesis: data collection, tactics in the form of 
changing technology, and rapid deployment via repair work. The “Management decisions 
& actions box” is the only reference to actual learning described by relentless follow-up, 
but real accountability and learning is not addressed.  
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Multiple agencies and private corporations own the interconnected pieces of CI; 
this limits communication as public agencies and private corporations perform 
independently and without the follow-up stage that this thesis adapts from the NYPD 
CompStat model. Proprietary rights conflict with the need for transparency when fixing 
CI due to private companies owning CI and wanting to maintain industry-specific 
monopolies. Companies do not want to share trade information that gives their 
competitors an advantage.83 In New York City, Mayor Bill DeBlasio initiated a working 
group to address this issue by having a neutral third party—possibly academic—
responsible for the repository of such information.84 This process allows for 
improvements without endangering corporate secrets. As explored in the introduction of 
this thesis, the Governmental Accountability Office cited failures in the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Sector-Specific Agency and Industry plans due to private industry 
withholding proprietary information to maintain industry superiority. Mayor DeBlasio’s 
plan would eliminate the secrecy and allow for more accurate information sharing. The 
working group is discussed further in this chapter regarding underground CI resources 
and private corporation’s proprietary rights. 
Reports indicate trouble with emergency preparedness, yet we lack a follow-up 
plan. The system of accountability recommended in this thesis would incorporate a plan 
and critiques into a forum that discusses the issues and implements better ideas. DHS has 
released reports with overviews of urban CI, noting concerns with current evacuation 
plans in the major cities and the effects of population shifts on the nation’s CI system. 
After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, federal agencies reviewed evacuation plans for urban 
areas to assess the need for improvements. DHS’s Nationwide Plan Review and the 
Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan 
Evaluation cite that “some of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States—New 
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York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago—do not have adequate mass evacuation plans in 
place.”85  
A DHS case study demonstrated that fluctuations in population have adverse 
effects on infrastructure. An increase in population causes a greater need for 
transportation infrastructure. Expanding urban centers are growing faster than new 
infrastructure is built, improved, or retrofitted. In addition, a decrease in population 
causes shortfalls in funding. Households below the poverty line, retirees paying low 
taxes, and those who have outstanding tax liens create shortages to local economies.86 
Maintaining a stable population level while also increasing economic growth is best for 
CI needs. 
The combination of population information, research into hours lost, fuel wasted, 
and emissions increased due to poor roads and improper construction schedules and 
depict a need for prioritized CI improvements. The American Highway Users Alliance is 
“a nonprofit advocacy organization serving as the united voice of the transportation 
community promoting safe, uncongested highways and enhanced freedom of mobility 
since 1932.”87 Their report, Unclogging America’s Highways 2015: Prescriptions for 
Healthier Highways, identifies the 50 worst traffic bottlenecks in the United States. 
Number one is the Kennedy Expressway in Chicago. By way of comparison, this 
chokepoint extends 12 miles, costing drivers 16.9 million hours in time and wastes 6.3 
million gallons of fuel annually.88 These delays are not the result of a one-time event or a 
construction-related glitch. They are due to a poorly constructed interchange not built for 
its current usage amounts. By correcting this area, a reduction of 133 million pounds of 
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carbon dioxide annually would be achieved.89 New York City has nine of the 50 worst 
bottlenecks.90 
A system to promote communication and cooperation would address the 
prioritization of CI repairs and improvements. Homeland Security depends on CI to move 
people, products, and emergency equipment. Without proper functionality, a limit to 
improvements in CI will continue, due to the lack of government oversight, inadequate 
evacuation plans, lack of collaboration between city agencies and private entities, and 
shifting populations. 
B. NEW YORK STATE 
The New York State Office of Emergency Management monitors New York State 
Critical Infrastructure but does not provide the oversight for New York City CI that this 
thesis recommends; therefore, the city government must take on that responsibility itself. 
NYS OEM issues plans similar to those developed by the federal government, but those 
are not reviewed or critiqued by any agencies. The New York State Homeland Security 
Strategy for 2014–2016 identifies its second goal as protecting critical infrastructure and 
Key Resources.91 As evidenced in Table 3, increasing communication and accountability 
is not one of the objectives. 
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Table 3. NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services 
Homeland Security Strategy 2014–2016, Goal 292 
 
 
Table 3, produced by the New York State Division of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Services (DHSES) as part of their NYS Homeland Security Strategy 2014–
2016, depicts an excellent model for CI improvement, yet fails to discuss the issues 
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recommended in this thesis: How can DHSES ensure participation, communication, and 
accountability? 
TRIP, a private non-profit founded in 1971, promotes CI improvements to relieve 
traffic congestion. It is sponsored by those that create equipment or do the physical 
repairs associated with roadways.93 The studies released by TRIP rate road conditions. 
Table 4 indicates the conditions of New York State roadways in urban areas, with New 
York City Metro rates being the worst in the state with 51 percent of the roads rated as 
poor and only 13 percent rated as good.94 
Table 4. Road Conditions in Urban Cities in New York State95 
 
 
Table 4 indicates that more than half of NYC metro roads are in poor condition 
and one-third in mediocre condition, leaving less than 20 percent in acceptable condition. 
NYC depends on CI for basic commuting, routine emergency response, and evacuation 
preparedness. This thesis develops an accountability measure to increase repairs of road 
conditions and follow-up on failures. When broken down along the same urban areas in 
                                                 
93 “About TRIP,” TRIP, accessed September 5, 2016, http://tripnet.org/about.php. 
94 “New York’s Top Transportation Issues: Meeting the State’s Needs for Safe, Smooth, and Efficient 
Mobility,” TRIP—A National Transportation Research Group, accessed September 4, 2016, 3. 
http://www.tripnet.org/docs/NY_Top_Transportation_Issues_TRIP_Report_Jan_2016.pdf. 
95 Ibid., 6. 
 33 
New York State, New York City experiences the most in congestion costs and 
commuting hours lost, as documented in Table 5.96 
Table 5. NYS Congestion Costs and Hours Lost97 
 
 
Table 5 presents the staggering dollar amount spent per year by the average 
motorist on congestion and work time lost due to the same congestion. There are many 
reasons for congestion, but this thesis addresses road conditions and road reconstruction 
that delay travel. Studies conducted by TRIP also denote past increases in population and 
how that will affect cities in the future. “New York’s population reached approximately 
19.7 million residents in 2014, an 18 percent increase since 1990.”98 Reports indicate 
growth in vehicular travel of approximately 3.3 percent over 2013, 2014, and 2015 as 
well as an anticipated 15 percent growth by 2030.99 
C. NEW YORK CITY 
New York City CI differs from borough to borough, due to population density and 
roadway use; therefore, CI needs reflect those differences. There is a lack of research 
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regarding CI in NYC neighborhoods and how they are affected. Emergency response, 
evacuation, and daily travel are all affected by the deteriorating CI, which then creates 
repercussions for Homeland Security. The discrepancies in vehicle ownership in different 
boroughs, as well as the number of vehicles commuting through parts of the city, need to 
be tracked by the agencies responsible and the methodology of how to incorporate those 
discrepancies into CI protection and improvement must be collaborated. Compared with 
other metropolitan areas, New York City has the highest rate of households without 
access to private vehicles, as shown in Table 6.100 This translates into the need for 
different methods of transportation to evacuate more people. Figure 4 outlines private 
vehicle ownership by boroughs and neighborhoods and is presented to display the 
disproportionate rate of vehicle ownership across New York City’s boroughs. Parts of 
this thesis are dedicated specifically to Staten Island, New York, where vehicle 
ownership is the highest of any borough. Chapter IV discusses specific incidents with 
lack of communication affecting Staten Island. 
Table 6. Carless Households101 
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The data in Table 6 directly conflicts with the map in Figure 4. NYC cannot be 
looked at as simply one city; population and road use differ greatly by borough. A 
monitoring, communication, and accountability model should be based on these issues so 
all populations receive prioritized improvements based on the needs of their area. 
Figure 4. Car Ownership Rates in NYC102 
 
The map in Figure 4, when coupled with the NYC bridge crossing rates from 
Figure 5, indicates the needs of Staten Island residents to commute via private vehicle. 
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The number of New Jersey residents commuting through Staten Island to get to other 
parts of NYC also needs to be taken into account. Both of these aspects determine a need 
for resilient roadways that are well maintained and monitored. This thesis recommends a 
model to account for differences in different boroughs. 
Figure 5. Cars on Metropolitan Transit Authority Bridges and Tunnels, 2011103 
  
Figure 5 indicates travel over major NYC bridges, indicating the concern of 
Staten Island CI. The number of vehicles crossing the Verrazano Narrows Bridge yearly 
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represents those of Staten Island residents as well as those commuting through Staten 
Island. Those vehicles arrive at the Verrazano Bridge via major highways, thoroughfares, 
and secondary roads, causing damage through use and causing delays while they use 
roads not intended for increased traffic. Roads need to be maintained in priority order by 
the respective agencies, and accountability must be ensured. 
The Manhattan-based Center for an Urban Future is a public policy think-tank 
that details current issues with New York City’s Infrastructure based on previous 
policy.104 Their report, Caution Ahead, cites failures, such as the previous NYC 
administration promoting larger-scale projects and neglecting essential resurfacing, the 
resurfacing and funding gap, and the effect that commuting has on businesses in NYC. 
The connection between business opportunity and shifting populations, and the effect on 
CI relates back to TRIP’s report regarding loss of tax revenue and future CI issues. 
Caution Ahead details the policies of the Bloomberg administration that caused 
the CI deterioration currently experienced. Michael Bloomberg was the mayor of NYC 
and served three terms from 2002–2014.105 An example of failure cited in Caution 
Ahead is the construction of New York City’s first new water tunnel in 100 years while 
the Department of Environmental Protection fell behind its schedule for water main 
replacements.106 This lapse in scheduling also occurred in street repaving. 
The report describes a funding gap of $3.2 billion dollars in the 2014–2017 capital 
needs for investment in New York City infrastructure but includes many facets not 
usually covered academically as infrastructure, such as public housing, hospitals, and 
prisons.107 Citing only the Department of Transportation, the report indicates a  
$789 million funding gap108 for CI repairs, including the 30.4 percent of NYC roadways 
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deemed in fair or poor condition.109 Table 7 displays roadway conditions broken down 
by borough.110  
Table 7. NYC Roads in Poor/Fair Condition111 
Borough Fair/Poor Roads 
Manhattan 43% 





This thesis focuses on taking cited reports and collected intelligence and 
incorporating a communication model to create accountability and improvement. In 
analyzing the future, Caution Ahead shows that the New York City Department of 
Transportation is not meeting required goals to maintain roadways. The DOT “sets a goal 
of resurfacing approximately 1,000 lane miles of streets each year, but the agency has 
fallen short of that target on all but three occasions since Fiscal Year 2000 (FY2009, 
FY2011 and FY2012). During this period, it resurfaced an average of only 852 lane miles 
per year,”112 as displayed in Figure 6 
Failures and lack of reaching anticipated CI goals are well documented, yet they 
continue. Some reports issued yearly detail specifics but miss the follow-up phase that 
contributes to the success of the CompStat model. Information provided to the media by 
local politicians indicates the fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016 have also fallen below 
expectations, but a new initiative has allotted money to pave 1200 miles in 2016 and 
1300 miles in 2017. The budget money allocated does not continue past 2017 and will 






have to be renegotiated back into the budget.113 Some sources indicate that setting the 
goal at 1000 lane miles still falls short, and a more appropriate schedule is 1,200 miles a 
year to prevent deterioration beyond useful life.  
Figure 6. Resurfacing Gap, NYC Department of Transportation114 
 
Figure 6 depicts the years in which the NYC DOT failed to meet their goal of 
repairing the targeted number of lane miles. This thesis examines how to take this 
information, correct the issues that cause the deficit, and ensure follow up. 
The pavement life cycle in Figure 7 demonstrates the importance of routine 
resurfacing, a pivotal CI issue. Without an accountability model, roads left to deteriorate 
past the fair rating will decline exponentially faster, costing more to fix. As depicted, 
paved roads have a surface life of approximately 15 years at which point they experience 
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a 40 percent drop in quality. In the next 2.5 years, roads experience and additional 40 
percent drop, at which time the repair cost is five times what it would have been if the 
repairs had been done in a timely manner. The goal is to rate and repair roads promptly to 
avoid the extra costs associated.115  
Figure 7. Pavement Life Cycle, Conditions, and Costs116 
 
This thesis describes a model of communication and prioritization to prevent 
unnecessary deterioration. As discussed in this chapter, there is a cycle and a necessity to 
proper maintenance involving budgetary issues. In testimony to the New York City 
Council, Adam Forman, a research associate at Center for an Urban Future, highlighted 
the need to maintain and improve New York City infrastructure to continue attracting 
businesses. “With overcrowded subways, decrepit airport terminals, and potholed streets, 
talented individuals will leave the Big Apple, opting for San Francisco, London, or Hong 
Kong.”117 Losing businesses and talented people to work in those companies lowers the 
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tax base, widening the budget gap, extending the resurfacing gap, and causing greater 
issues with CI. 
Studies reveal the effects of emergency incidents on transportation systems 
indicating that all modes of transport have not been maintained to the highest level 
possible, necessitating the need for rigorous follow-up on all projects. The Rudin Center 
for Transportation Policy and Management at New York University’s Wagner School 
also explores challenges in transportation and infrastructure.118 As indicated in the Rudin 
Center’s 2012 Transportation Before and After Sandy, major events cause shifts in 
transportation methods and commuting in New York City. The immediate travel times on 
days before and after Hurricane Sandy are shown to have doubled in most places, but 
almost tripled for Staten Island residents, as indicated in Table 8.119 
Table 8. Commute Times, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Sandy120 
 
 
Figure 8 demonstrates how commuters changed their driving habits after 
Hurricane Sandy, including a 35 percent drop in subway travel resulting in a 1 percent 
increase in driving and taxi use, a 3 percent increase in bus usage, and a 7 percent 
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increase in walking.121 The drop in subway availability and usage caused an increase in 
bicycling, buses, and driving; all of which affect road conditions and are affected by road 
conditions.122 The concern in the 7 percent increase in walking will be discussed further 
in regard to personal injury claims against NYC due to street conditions. Improperly 
paved streets cause pedestrians to trip and repeated construction causes pedestrians to 
take different and occasionally dangerous routes.  
Figure 8. Travel Modes, Pre- and Post-Hurricane Sandy123 
 
Reports address the New York City Department of Transportation’s failure to 
accurately track roadwork completed and its misrepresentation of improvements. The 
accountability and communication model presented in this thesis would promote 
transparency. New York City Comptroller, Scott Stringer, conducted an audit on the 
NYC DOT’s Tracking of Pothole Repairs to determine if the agency was adequately 
tracking pothole repair efforts. As one of the few examples of an audit or review of city 
agencies’ performance in regard to NYC CI, the report reveals the DOT’s denial of the 
findings of the audit and the methods used to conclude those findings. “DOT’s response 
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contains a disconcerting number of inaccuracies regarding the audit’s methodologies. In a 
number of instances… the agency presents scenarios that are simply inaccurate. This is of 
particular concern because they come from the agency’s senior management, which 
should be familiar with the operations of its own agency.”124 
Traffic engineering experts raise concerns regarding reports issued by the DOT. 
As the agency increases transparency, critics question the legitimacy of the numbers. 
Chapter V indicates the issues CompStat created with fraudulently inflating numbers, but 
as the technology and tracking of intelligence progresses, accuracy is increasing. Sam 
Schwartz was the New York City Traffic Commissioner, and the second in command of 
the Department of Transportation when the agencies merged. He has made a name for 
himself in public office and as the head of his engineering firm. Schwartz coined the term 
“gridlock” and is considered an expert in traffic-related issues. In August of 2016, the 
New York Times posted a story about the never-ending process of filling New York City 
potholes. The article quoted a traffic blog, Daily Pothole, and its recent count of 209,436 
potholes filled as of August 8, 2016.125 Schwartz, noticing the discrepancy stated, 
“Every administration has said they have filled more potholes than ever. The math 
doesn’t always work out; 209,436 potholes had been filled this year as of Monday (8/29/
16). That’s about 40 potholes per hour, day and night, seven days a week.”126 
City agencies, state agencies and private companies currently work in their own 
silos. This thesis focuses on collaboration of disciplines enabling sections, areas, and 
neighborhoods of the different boroughs to be repaired simultaneously regardless of who 
is responsible to maintain the property. In the Audit Report on the Department of 
Transportation’s Tracking of Pothole Repairs, the NYC comptroller describes issues 
with DOT’s tracking of pothole repairs. In a previous report, Comptroller Stringer 
identified the worst roadways in New York City for pothole-related vehicular damage 
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and the amounts paid by the city for repairs.127 Figure 9 describes the condition of 
roadways maintained by the NYSDOT as opposed to NYCDOT.  
Figure 9. Roads with Most Vehicular Damage Claims128 
 
The graph in Figure 9 indicates raw numbers of claims but fails to indicate that, 
while the Belt Parkway causes 28.2 damage claims per mile and the Brooklyn-Queens 
Expressway causes 12 claims, the Staten Island Expressway causes 48 damage claims per 
mile.129 The road incidents that cause these events cause slower traffic as well as drivers 
moving to surface streets to avoid the damaged roads or traffic backup. New York City 
paid out substantial amounts of money for pedestrian injuries and vehicle damage 
resulting from defective roadways between July 2009 to July 2015. NYC paid $1.5 
million for 1,529 of the 12,286 claims filed for vehicle damage and $138 million for 
2,681 of the 5,913 claims filed for personal injury.130 Unnecessary expenditures spent on 
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injury and damage claims is better directed toward maintenance and improvement. A 
better method of repairing and maintaining roadways, as well as communication between 
the state DOT and city DOT, would reduce these claims. 
Weather- and usage-related potholes are not the only CI issues with road surfaces. 
Underground CI maintenance and construction cause roadways to be pockmarked with 
patches. Mayor Bill DeBlasio’s working group studied better procedures for 
underground critical infrastructure repair. The report issued develops strategies for 
communication between the city and the major utility providers. The report cites that 
“approximately 40% of all DOT street opening permits are issued to Con Edison [the 
local energy provider] or National Grid [the local natural gas provider] for work related 
to their utility networks.”131 The strategies, however, do not address methods to ensure 
communication between city agencies.  
The system of accountability recommended in this thesis requires private 
companies to be held accountable for inadequate work and communication to be 
established between city agencies and private companies. Street opening permits allow 
private utilities companies to open up pavement to do underground repair work to their 
systems. Currently, there are no criteria in place for how and when to conduct these 
openings, and more importantly, the size and type of closure required. As a vocal 
proponent for road repair, Staten Island Borough President James Oddo addresses this 
troubling issue in his social media briefings. Oddo noted that in 2003, New York City 
issued 116,000 permits to cut open a street. In 2015, the number almost doubled to 
223,271.132 The borough president is a vocal critic of the DOT and pushed Mayor 
DeBlasio to increase street repaving to achieve Staten Island’s share of the 1,000 lane 
miles paved each year. These cuts by the utility companies receiving 40 percent of the 
223,000 permits cause weakened pavement, making them more susceptible to the abuses 
of snow, rain, freezing expanding water, and salt used for snow removal, thus, more 
                                                 
131 Infrastructure Report, City of New York, New York City Underground Infrastructure Working 
Group, (June 2014), 6, www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2014/
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132 James Oddo’s Facebook page, accessed September 3, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/
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potholes. On Monday, October 31, 2016, Borough President Oddo posted information to 
Facebook regarding a meeting he held with the DOT and National Grid, the local natural 
gas provider, regarding street cuts in newly paved protected streets. He mentioned, “our 
next meeting will include other utilities, as well as contractor industry representatives and 
other city agencies, namely the DEP.”133 Is the monitoring of an asset as crucial as CI 
being overlooked by responsible city agencies, leaving it to local elected officials to 
develop a system of communication, collaboration, and accountability? 
In addition to Hurricane Sandy, another emergency event tested Staten Island CI 
with frightening results of complete traffic shutdown on major thoroughfares and smaller 
secondary roads. On Friday, July 17, 2015, an emergency incident brought Staten Island 
traffic to a halt by a suspected terror threat. One day after the shooting in a military 
reserve center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, a retired police officer observed what looked 
like men and woman in Middle Eastern clothing loading rifles from one car to another. 
After he had called the police, a predictable massive response occurred. In an attempt to 
find the vehicles, all outgoing bridges were limited to one lane. The bridge closures 
caused a prolonged back-up on all highways, service roads, and major thoroughfares. “If 
there had been a real threat, if there actually had been a vanload of terrorists looking to 
shoot up the Island, or carrying a payload of explosives or biological weapons, we 
would have been screwed” stated one reporter. “Not only would Islanders have been 
sitting ducks, but the clogged roads would have prevented emergency responders from 
getting to the scene of any actual mayhem.”134 The shutdown prevented escape and 
response. The purpose of this thesis is to ensure roads are maintained properly and 
move as smoothly as possible.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrates the current state of roadway conditions in NYC and the 
recognized need to improve them. Those conditions impact Homeland Security in 
                                                 
133 Ibid. 
134 Tom Wrobleski, “Terror and traffic: Staten Island on Edge,” Staten Island Advance, July 20, 2016, 
http://www.silive.com/opinion/columns/index.ssf/2015/07/terror_and_traffic_staten_isla.html. 
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different ways. First, in a post-9/11, post-Hurricane Katrina, post–Hurricane Sandy 
environment, escape routes and emergency vehicle access is dependent on both the 
conditions of the roadways and the timeliness of repairs. Second, appropriate use of tax 
dollars must be a top concern to prevent any misappropriation. Third, organizations 
interested in cleaner transportation must take into account ways in which to make 
commuting more cost efficient and environmentally conscious. A method of ensuring 
communication and accountability can start in NYC and then develop to other geographic 
areas. Currently, there are accountability lacks within city agencies and communication 
lacks between city agencies. The next chapter provides specific incidents of 
communication failures between NYC agencies as reported through local media and 
politicians’ social media. The failures and the resulting actions duplicated work, caused 
traffic delays, and wasted taxpayers’ money. 
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IV. SAMPLE EVENTS 
Chapter III examined many issues with New York State Critical Infrastructure 
(CI), specifically focusing on New York City. Chapter IV contains sample events taken 
from local media sources, elected officials’ reports, and personal observation, all of 
which demonstrate the severe effects of lack of communication between city agencies, 
including poor repairs, wasted taxpayer money, and delays in substantial genuine 
improvement to critical infrastructure. The goal of listing these sample events is to 
identify the need for pre-event, pre-construction communication to determine a correct 
course of action, ensuring this communication assists in developing and testing any post-
event plans necessary in cases of evacuation and emergency response. This chapter lists 
events in order of increasing collaboration required: failures of city agencies to 
communicate with each other, followed by city agency/state agency failures, then city 
agency/federal agency failures, and finally, post-emergency event communication 
failures. 
A. ARTHUR KILL ROAD WIDENING 
Arthur Kill Road, a main thoroughfare in Staten Island, is an example of the lack 
of communication between the DOT and the Parks Department, as well as the exclusion 
of other stakeholder agencies. The widening of Arthur Kill Road impacted emergency 
traffic and wasted taxpayer dollars. The Brookfield Landfill is adjacent to Arthur Kill 
Road and was one of five New York City landfills illegally used between 1974 and 
1980.135 In 1982, a New York City Department of Sanitation official and a private 
sanitation hauler wound up incarcerated after the federal government investigated the 
illegal dumping.136 In 1990, New York City set $600 million aside for the cleanup of the 
five facilities.137 The city began work on four of the five locations, neglecting the fifth 
                                                 





site, the 272-acre Brookfield Landfill in Staten Island.138 In 2008, residents near the 
Brookfield Landfill filed suit in Manhattan Federal Court to force the city to clean up the 
site. The residents were successful, and in 2009, New York City allotted $141 million for 
cleanup.139 After some setbacks, remediation began in 2010. By mid-2012, NYC 
scheduled Brookfield Park for a 2017 completion, but the expected price rose to  
$266 million.140 Figure 10 shows an aerial view of the Brookfield site including its 
borders, Richmond Avenue and Arthur Kill Road. 
Figure 10. Aerial View of Brookfield Park141 
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The Brookfield Landfill, as it transitions into the Brookfield Park, abuts Arthur 
Kill Road, a narrow winding roadway slated for widening due to traffic congestion. As 
both projects—the widening of the road and building of the park—overlap, the lack of 
communication between city agencies wasted time and tax dollars with unnecessary 
projects completed and scheduled for removal at completion. In this area, Arthur Kill 
Road is a two-lane road (one lane in either direction). The proposal of widening the road 
gained momentum in 2012 when a new NYC mayor, Bill DeBlasio, was elected.142 In 
late 2012, Staten Island borough president James Oddo presented the proposal to Mayor 
DeBlasio, who accepted the merit of the idea.143 The proposal was discussed at length 
until early 2015, when Mayor DeBlasio allotted $15 million for completion of the 
project.144 Although 18 months later—at the time of the writing of this thesis—the 
project has not commenced, the adjacent Brookfield Park has new trees planted directly 
inside the newly installed fence, all of which are slated for removal when DOT widens 
Arthur Kill Road. Figure 11, similar to Figure 10, shows the aerial view but also depicts 
the area of proposed widening.  
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Figure 11. Aerial View of the Proposed Widening of Arthur Kill Road145 
 
Figure 12 shows a street-level view of approved street widening, noting new trees 
planted and the replaced fence along the inside of the fence line, which will have to be 
removed to widen the road. The red area will become the right lane of southbound traffic, 
necessitating sidewalk and new fencing to be placed past that area. 
Figure 12. Street-Level View of Approved Widening146 
 
                                                 
145 Source: Ibid. 
146 Source: Ibid. 
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A system of communication established between city agencies would enable 
discussion to prevent unnecessary projects and, on a larger note, to ensure limited 
resources are properly utilized. The unnecessary work demonstrates a need for multi-
agency collaboration and an accountability model. The Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) “holds monthly meetings with the Brookfield Landfill Citizens 
Advisory Committee, a board of volunteers that works in close collaboration with the 
department on oversight for the remediation of the Brookfield Landfill.”147 
Representatives designated by Community Board 3 and from the offices of 
Representative McMahon, the Staten Island borough president, the New York State 
Assembly, the State Senate, and the City Council comprise the committee.148 
The NYC DEP is overseeing the remediation process, but the meetings and 
committees listed fail to include the New York City Parks Department, which is tasked 
with the planting of the trees and installation of the fences, or the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), which could have provided information on the future street 
widening process.  
B. BAY TERRACE, STATEN ISLAND, WATER RUNOFF 
Good f**cking luck, Captain, getting DEP and DOT to work together. 
 —DEP Supervisor, Personal Communication 
 
Recently, there has been a lack of initiative and collaboration between the NYC 
DOT and the NYC Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) with continuing 
storm drainage issues, which destroyed streets, curbs, sidewalks, and other personal 
property in Staten Island. Storm drainage issues create hazardous conditions for 
emergency response and cost citizens money due to improper maintenance and 
improvement of CI. Beginning in 2004, residents of Twombly Avenue, in the Bay 
Terrace section of Staten Island, began making complaints to various city agencies 
                                                 
147 New York City Environmental Protection, “Brookfield Landfill Remediation, accessed September 
9, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/dep_projects/cp_brookfield_landfill.shtml. 
148 Ibid. 
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regarding damage from water runoff due to improper street grading and lack of a 
correctly positioned storm drain. The author came face to face with this issue, as a 
resident requesting collaboration from city agencies to perform a necessary repair. As 
shown in Figure 13, the sea-level elevation of the marked locations pitches water runoff 
from the Staten Island Rapid Transit (SIRT) tracks to Twombly Avenue from 82 feet to 
56 feet, respectively. The marked area at the northwest corner of Twombly Avenue and 
Hopkins Avenue does not have a catch basin for water runoff, and the marked pedestrian 
crosswalk is at a greater elevation than the street elevation immediately to the northwest, 
causing water to pool along the curb line for approximately 200 feet. This pooling of 
water deteriorated curbs and sidewalks, causing the issuance of violations to homeowners 
by the Department of Finance, as well as deterioration of the road asphalt. Figure 13 also 
shows the indicated elevation above sea level and key aspects of the complaints, as 
measured by the author. 
Figure 13. Aerial Image of Bay Terrace Section of Staten Island149 
 
                                                 
149 Adapted from “Bay Terrace State Island,” Google Maps, accessed September 9, 2016, 
https://www.google.com/maps/@40.558286,-74.1334856,140m/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=en. 
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Residents cited the need for a catch basin to be positioned correctly on Twombly 
Avenue to the west of the intersection with Hopkins Avenue. The current placement was 
only eight feet away on Hopkins Avenue just north of Twombly Avenue. Residents 
witnessed a DEP engineer test the water flow southbound on Hopkins Avenue from the 
indicated fire hydrant. The engineer reported to the DEP that there was no water flow 
problem. The residents grew more frustrated due to the DEP’s inattention to details. A 
careful communication process between all agencies and private companies might have 
rectified residents’ complaints. 
During a work-related assignment as a NYPD captain, the author of this thesis 
was present with a supervisor from the DEP. The author and the DEP supervisor 
discussed the water flow issue and the need for the DEP to install a catch basin and then 
have the DOT grade and repave the street. During a personal communication with the 
author, the DEP supervisor then stated, “Good f**king luck, Captain, getting DEP and 
DOT to work together.” Multiple requests for cooperation were ignored by city agencies 
and hopes of all work being completed correctly on an appropriate schedule vanished, 
leaving residents to push local elected officials to get involved, which resulted in street 
repaving in 2006. A model of communication and follow-up could have prioritized work 
to save taxpayer money and create a safer living environment. 
In 2014, the New York City Department of Design and Construction hired 
contractors to replace the sidewalks and curbs of the residents who received violations, 
billing the homeowner for the replacements. After ten years of complaints and damage, 
the city agency involved, DOT, addressed the issue. The work was improperly performed 
and caused damage to property, a situation that is currently in litigation. Beginning in 
March 2016, the Department of Design and Construction began a capital project to 
address water flow issues, which included installing catch basins on South Railroad 
Avenue to prevent water from flowing through residents’ properties and on Twombly 
Avenue west of Hopkins, to properly drain water running along the curb on Twombly 
Avenue. Figure 14 shows the scope of the project, and Figure 15 describes the work. 
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Figure 14. Department of Design and Construction Capital Projects150 
 
Figure 15. Department of Design and Construction Capital Projects151 
 
As of October 2016, the project is still under construction and the newly installed 
storm drains have been elevated, preventing water from flowing into them as shown in 
Figure 16. However, this is a temporary fix that has actually worsened conditions for the 
past seven months. As the issue continues, the NYC Department of Health is involved 
due to the standing water, which breeds mosquitos. West Nile Virus is a common fear in 
the summer, but the summer of 2016 also added the Zika virus to the list of concerns. The 
Department of Design and Construction, in their lack of response to complaints and lack 
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151 Source: Ibid. 
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of communication, added more problems to existing ones. A multi-agency oversight 
organization, allowing public viewing and input, could have resolved issues more quickly 
with less money wasted. 
Figure 16. New Installation of Storm Drain on the Corner of 
Twombly Avenue and Hopkins Avenue 
 
C. EASTERN PARKWAY 
A third communication failure risked pedestrian safety and wasted money when 
the NYC DOT failed to consult the NYPD and neighborhood civic organizations before 
removing recently installed pedestrian safety devices in the Crown Heights section of 
Brooklyn. Eastern Parkway was labeled as the fourth highest intersection in NYC in 2012 
for pedestrian fatalities.152 Due to those fatalities and other injuries, in late 2015 the 
DOT installed the pedestrian islands shown in Figure 17.153 
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Figure 17. Pedestrian Island—Eastern Parkway154 
 
Photo Credit: Angel Chevrestt 
The lack of communication prior to installation caused neighborhood issues to be 
overlooked; once installed, the removal of the pedestrian island endangered the 
pedestrian community and closed off the thoroughfare during reconstruction. Eastern 
Parkway is the location of the annual West Indian Day Parade on Labor Day Weekend. 
The parade consists of Caribbean-costumed participants and flatbed tractor-trailers with 
bands and speakers. Before the 2016 parade, the DOT removed the pedestrian island, 
causing traffic build-up and limiting response to potential emergencies, as indicated in 
Figure 18.155  
 
 
                                                 
154 Source: Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
 59 
Figure 18. Eastern Parkway Pedestrian Island Removal156 
 
Photo Credit: Rachael Holliday Smith 
Scott Gastel, a spokesman for the NYC DOT stated “the concrete islands were 
removed due to safety concerns involving parade participants and large vehicles.”157 
Gastel added, “we are looking at potential replacement treatments in the area and for the 
long term.”158 In addition to the short-term construction issues, the removal sparked 
community outrage with one resident stating, “The parade is one day out of the year. The 
main thing is the pedestrians, the kids and the schoolchildren.”159 The controversy 
regarding the pedestrian islands has supporters on the pedestrian safety side as well as the 
parade organizers side. The recommendation of this thesis is to study issues more 
carefully and have an open forum for communication to prevent removal of vital 
infrastructure 10 months after placement. 
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D. SUPERSTORM SANDY BUYOUT AND REBUILDING 
Another example of communication breakdown between the NYC DOT and the 
NYC Parks Department involved New York State agencies as well. New York State 
purchased Superstorm Sandy ravaged land on Staten Island, turning it into park land for 
the NYC Parks Department. The DOT paved the streets on that land as routine scheduled 
roadwork. Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012, at approximately 8 pm 
EST in Atlantic City, New Jersey, just 125 miles south of Staten Island, New York. The 
storm began a week earlier in the Caribbean and upgraded and downgraded numerous 
times before hitting New York and New Jersey with 80-mile-an-hour sustained winds and 
14-foot waves.160 Sandy is responsible for 42 deaths in New York, 12 in New Jersey, 
and many others in the continental United States.161 The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) estimates the damage at approximately $50 billion.162 
Waves devastated the Ocean Breeze beach front section of Staten Island as indicated in 
Figures 19 and 20. Figure 19 shows a map of the area and Figure 20 shows a satellite 
image of the same area. Figure 20 depicts the area regarding proximity to the water, 
clusters of houses, and the surrounding empty land. 
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Figure 19. Street Map of Ocean Breeze, Staten Island163 
 
Figure 20. Satellite Map of Ocean Breeze, Staten Island164 
 
Figure 21 shows 6–18-foot waves, the highest reported in NYC, hitting the area 
and causing destruction to some homes and significant damage to others, but all homes in 
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the area were affected.165 As indicated in Figure 21, the circled area was assaulted by 6–
18-foot waves, leaving behind significant damage and destruction. 
Figure 21. Map of Flood Zone, Ocean Breeze, Staten Island166 
 
New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo declared a state of emergency after the 
storm, and, one year later, announced government funded buyouts of over 100 houses.167 
The buyout replaces destroyed homes with parkland and creates a barrier between the 
ocean and houses farther inland. Barbara Brancaccio, the spokeswoman for the 
Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, stated, “It’s really a resiliency program, we are 
going to get you out of here, because it’s dangerous, and we’re also going to make it safer 
for everybody else through this natural buffer.”168 
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Six months later, in April 2014, the NYC DOT announced plans to repave the 
streets in the Ocean Breeze section. After community and political outrage, the outspoken 
Borough President of Staten Island, James Oddo, said, “This is simply ridiculous. Next 
time a crotchety senator or congressman rants on and on about not wanting to provide 
New York with federal money, they will point to things like this.”169  
The Department of Transportation completed the road resurfacing project in the 
affected area, Liberty Avenue, on June 20, 2014, and informed Borough President Oddo of 
another street with the same situation in the nearby Midland Beach section, street 
resurfacing on Baden Avenue in Midland Beach on May 5, 2014, as displayed in Figure 
22.170 
Figure 22. Department of Transportation Protected Streets Listing171 
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E. GATEWAY NATIONAL PARK 
The lack of communication, collaboration, and accountability between NYC and 
federal agencies demonstrates the need for improved focus. The National Park  
Service (NPS) oversees Gateway National Park but is not maintaining the land that abuts 
land that falls within NYC Parks Department, NYC Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(MTA), and NYC DOT property. Although this has no direct threat or effect on 
homeland security, national and city parks are listed as infrastructure and received a C- 
rating nationally in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) ratings provided 
earlier. The lack of communication between city agencies and the federal government 
displayed in this event is problematic; allowing property conditions to degrade due to 
lack of accountability wastes taxpayer money and frustrates residents. 
Gateway National Park and Great Kills Beach, located south of Hylan Boulevard 
in Staten Island, have been maintained by the National Park Service since 1972. In 2014, 
residents complained to local elected officials regarding the deteriorating condition of the 
park and garbage accumulation. Officials held a press conference at the location after 
letters and requests were not answered by the respective agencies. Congressman Michael 
Grimm delineated the agencies and property responsibilities to the attendees.172 
Councilman Vincent Ignizio joined Congressman Grimm and added, “Clearly, 
government is not working properly. It’s a filthy mess,”173 and “Let’s sit around the 
table and come up with a solution that will keep this place clean,”174 
This thesis recommends an accountability and communication model, similar to 
the NYPD’s CompStat model, to promote, foster, and ensure that exact process results in 
improved critical infrastructure. Figure 23 depicts the adjacent property of agencies 
involved. 
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Figure 23. Gateway National Park Entrance175 
 
Figure 23 depicts the four agencies involved in this intersection. Getting those 
four agencies to collaborate would create a safer, cleaner neighborhood. An 
accountability model would ensure all agencies are maintaining their respective property. 
F. HYLAN BOULEVARD—STATEN ISLAND EXPRESSWAY 
DETERIORATION 
Previous sample events detailed failures in communication between city agencies, 
then between city and state agencies, and finally between city and federal agencies, but 
all were prior to emergency events, focusing on repair and maintenance. This thesis 
recommends agency collaboration overseen by the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure in 
conjunction with Emergency Management (NYC EM), which is currently tasked with 
only post-emergency multi-agency collaboration.  
                                                 






The next event depicts failures in post-emergency event communication. The 
NYC DOT’s inadequate repair work to the Hylan Boulevard overpass on the Staten 
Island Expressway caused a second deterioration six years later, resulting in long-term 
construction and traffic issues, both of which affect general and emergency 
transportation. Hylan Boulevard passes over the Staten Island Expressway in two 
locations—one northbound and one southbound—at the northernmost end of the Staten 
Island Expressway before the Verrazano Bridge. See Figure 25. The northbound lane 
services 8300 vehicles daily and the southbound, 8,800. In late April 2009, deterioration 
of the roadway of the northbound lane caused baseball-sized concrete pieces to rain down 
onto the Staten Island Expressway 25 feet below. The falling concrete caused closure of 
the eastbound Staten Island Expressway for hours as the fire department placed 
emergency netting under the overpass. The overpass itself was closed for days afterward 
to repair the nine-inch hole in the roadbed with exposed rebar, as shown in Figure 24. 
The cause was determined to be freezing winter weathers and use of salt to melt ice and 
snow. The investigation revealed that neighborhood residents had complained about the 
widening hole for weeks prior.176 
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Figure 24. Broken Concrete and Exposed Construction Rebar177 
 
Photo Credit: Hilton Flores 
Figure 25. View of Northbound Hylan Boulevard Overpass178 
 
Photo Credit: Hilton Flores 
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On June 3, 2015, State Senator Kirsten Gillibrand cited a New York State 
Department of Transportation report noting 74 percent of Staten Island’s highway bridges 
are either “functionally obsolete” or “structurally deficient.”179 Eight days later, a hole 
opened up in the same location that was previously addressed in 2009. The NYS DOT 
immediately began a project to replace the decking of the overpass, which had been 
slated for repair at an unspecified date and was estimated to cost $10 million.180 Local 
elected officials were outraged over the decision that caused hours of delays of the 
uninformed public, also giving emergency responders no time to prepare for traffic 
control and emergency response. An agreement was reached to postpone the project for 
three weeks until after July 4. On June 22, 2015, a second hole opened in a different 
portion of the roadway. DOT covered the section with a steel plate in anticipation of the 
upcoming full-scale construction.181 
The initial deterioration was due to inadequate CI upkeep. After the discovery of 
the first hole, inefficient repair methods used, and further rehabilitation did not 
commence until after the second incident occurred six years later. When DOT expedited 
the construction plan, information was not disseminated to local media sources, elected 
officials, and community members. The disconnect between the city and state agencies, 
the elected officials, and the community is addressed in this thesis. 
G. MAJOR ACCIDENT ON VICTORY BOULEVARD 
Our final example of poorly coordinated post-event emergency collaboration was 
the lack of city agencies’ and private companies’ communication requiring street closure 
for two and a half days after an early morning car accident at closed a section of a major 
Staten Island thoroughfare. On September 7, 2015, at 2 a.m., a driver lost control of his 
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vehicle, striking a tree. While the driver only suffered minor injuries, the chain reaction 
began with the impacted tree falling on overhead power lines, pulling them down along 
with multiple utility poles supporting those wires. Figures 26 and 27 show the extent of 
the damage.182 
Figure 26. Victory Boulevard Accident183 
 
Photo Credit: Anthony DePrimo 
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Figure 27. Victory Boulevard Accident184 
 
Photo Credit: Anthony DePrimo 
Residents complained to local media, resulting in reporters questioning agency 
response. After the new poles were installed, DOT referred questions regarding re-
opening the street to the NYPD, who forwarded requests to Con Edison, the local 
electricity provider. The New York City Fire Department representatives present 
indicated the reason for closure was the need for Con Edison to hang new wires. The 
NYC Councilwoman in that district, Deborah Rose, stated, “It’s ridiculous that Victory 
Boulevard, a major thoroughfare, is closed to through traffic during weekday rush 
hours, and on the first day of school.”185 Residents and elected officials were 




                                                 




This chapter lists specific incidents collected from elected officials’ reports, local 
media stories, and personal observation, making those local elected officials the 
repository of concerns of the taxpayers, who insist on a more transparent and accountable 
government. The events are organized by order of increasing necessity for 
communication. The first section details street widening, water runoff, and pedestrian 
safety; these incidents require communication between city agencies. The second 
grouping: Superstorm Sandy buyout and Gateway National Park, required collaboration 
with state and federal agencies, respectively. Finally, the Hylan Boulevard deterioration 
and Victory Boulevard accident also demonstrate failure in emergency event 
coordination. The NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations coordinates pre-event 
collaboration and follow-up. NYC Emergency Management (NYC EM) is tasked with 
collaboration of resources in a post-emergency environment. The last two incidents 
reflect the need for coordination of city services in emergency incidents. A 
communication model for non-emergency incidents would greatly assist in emergency 
incidents as well. A dedicated Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure and a system of pre-event, 
routine communication and monitoring, such as the NYPD’s CompStat model, will 
ensure effective organization between agencies and that resources are spent wisely. 
Chapter V details how CompStat works within the NYPD and how it could be 
applied to create the NYC Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure. 
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V. COMPSTAT 
Chapter IV presented sample events of communication failures that resulted in 
wasted tax dollars and, in some cases, limited access to roadways for emergency response 
and everyday transportation. Chapter V analyzes the New York City Police Departments 
CompStat model as a possible solution; CompStat significantly reduced crime in NYC 
while encouraging communication-enhancing accountability and Chapter V also reviews 
models similar to CompStat from other police departments and disciplines. This thesis 
recommends that the mayor’s office prioritize CI by creating the NYC Mayor’s Office of 
Infrastructure, and that the Office of Infrastructure implement a CompStat model to 
ensure CI fixes, by building on the existing office of Operations Infrastructure theme. 
Adapting the NYPD’s model of CompStat to CI improvement and protection will create a 
system of communication, accountability, and interagency collaboration. 
A. OVERVIEW 
Performance measurement enables officials to hold organizations 
accountable and to introduce consequences for performance. It helps 
citizens and customers judge the value that government creates for them. 
And it provides managers with the data they need to improve 
performance.186 
CompStat, short for comparative statistics, is a police management and 
accountability tool that began in the NYPD in 1994. Police Commissioner William 
Bratton spent time with the Boston Metro Police Department and the NYC Transit Police 
before being appointed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to head the largest police agency in 
the country, at a time of uncontrolled crime and decreasing quality of life.187  
At the time, New York City was ten years into the fight against the crack 
epidemic and needed a system of accountability to monitor and reduce crime. During 
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those ten years, the homicide rate for African-American males age 14–24 had doubled, 
60 percent of prisoners’ cases involved drug offenses, and the fetal mortality rate in inner 
cities had increased by over 20 percent.188 Quality of life, in general, was deteriorating 
rapidly.  
Violence typically begins as lower-level disorder and chaos. Commissioner 
Bratton associated Kelling’s and Wilson’s “broken windows” theory to lower-level 
quality of life crimes. “Broken windows” theorizes that, if lower-lever violations are left 
alone, an increase in more serious crimes will occur.189 The name comes from the belief 
that a broken window left in disrepair is a sign that property owners do not care, resulting 
in more broken windows and destruction.190 Wesley Skogan, Northwestern University 
policing and disorder professor, identified the cycle shown in Figure 28. 
Figure 28. Spiral of Decline191 
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This cycle demonstrates how the broken windows theory contributes to more 
lawless behavior as the cycle worsens. To disrupt the pattern, the NYPD needed a system 
to address the increased crime by tracing the cycle backward to citizen fear and disorder. 
The CompStat model monitored the aspects of the cycle and created accountability for 
those entrusted to disrupt it. 
Commissioner Bratton and a team of dedicated advisors devised the CompStat 
system, in order to combat crime with accountability, based on four principles:  
• Accurate and timely intelligence 
• Effective tactics 
• Rapid deployment 
• Relentless follow-up and assessment192 
 
The principles and structure are addressed in the following section but due to the 
terminology used, it is important to discuss a sample of the New York City Police 
Department’s structure as it relates to CompStat. 
There are currently 77 precincts in New York City divided into five geographic 
boroughs and eight patrol boroughs. The police commissioner is a civilian title, appointed 
by the mayor. The chief of department is the highest-ranking uniformed member of the 
department. The deputy commissioner of operations is also a civilian rank who works 
directly for the chief of department and is tasked with overseeing CompStat. The NYPD 
is broken down into bureaus covering housing, transit, transportation, detectives, and 
patrol functions. The chief of patrol commands the eight patrol boroughs, each supervised 
by an assistant chief, titled borough commander. The borough commander oversees the 
precincts within his or her patrol borough. In Figure 29, the author outlines a sample of 
the hierarchal structure within the NYPD, depicting one patrol borough with two 
precincts as an example. 
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Figure 29. NYPD Hierarchy 
 
B. FOUR PRINCIPLES OF COMPSTAT 
The four principles of CompStat depict the process of monitoring crime increase 
and fostering crime decrease. The descriptions come from the first Deputy Commissioner 
of Operations, Jack Maple’s, writings, and this author’s personal observations of over a 
decade of CompStat experience. In Chapter VI, this thesis demonstrates the use of 
CompStat and the four principles as a model of performance management for critical 
infrastructure (CI) through communication and accountability. 
1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence  
Accurate and timely intelligence is an essential first step to the CompStat process, 
which would also work well for a CI system.193 A methodology must be in place to 
quickly track the criteria the director decides upon. In the case of the NYPD’s CompStat 
model, the intelligence is the seven index crimes and quality-of-life violations. The focus 
is the analysis of computer-driven statistical data for each crime, including where it 
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occurred, when, the method of commission, and pedigree descriptions of the victim(s) 
and the perpetrator. The FBI’s Unified Crime Reporting Data dictates the categories of 
crime tracked: criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft. The first adjustment needed was the timeliness of 
reporting. The FBI required the information sent yearly, but this delay prevented 
immediate analysis. Commissioner Bratton and Deputy Commissioner of Operations Jack 
Maple invested in the necessary technological advances to ensure intelligence gathering 
and forwarding on a daily basis. The application of this principle to road and bridge 
repair is the collection of data on projects initiated by all New York City agencies. Each 
agency currently has computerized records, most using Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) technologies to plot incidents or projects on a map. A compatible software design 
is required to allow all agencies to collate and communicate together, to avoid 
overlapping initiatives. 
This thesis explores creating a CompStat Unit within the newly created NYC 
Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure’s Office, focusing on communication and accountability, 
to monitor and improve NYC CI. That process begins with the collection of intelligence 
on the current state of CI. 
2. Effective Tactics 
The second principle of CompStat, effective tactics, uses the previously collected 
intelligence to determine what resources are needed and where, which would be an 
excellent asset toward improving CI. It is the function of the department to foster, enable, 
and oversee the collection of said intelligence, and, once that intelligence is amassed, the 
precinct commander analyzes it to determine deployment. The phrase “put cops on the 
dots” has been employed to summarize the crime-reduction strategies.194 Once 
commanders locate and analyze the trouble spots, they decide what level of enforcement 
is needed. That commander monitors the activity generated and the decrease in incidents 
of crime. The monitoring of the process will be covered further in the follow-up section 
of the CompStat process. Thinking outside of the box is encouraged of the precinct 
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commander and his/her subordinates. A lack of resources, such as personnel or 
equipment, can impede progress, but a plethora of such resources is not necessarily the 
answer. Intelligently analyzed deployments are the backbone of the CompStat strategy.  
Before CompStat, the NYPD was a more reactive agency; responding to 
complaints of crimes was part of the increase in lawlessness in the 1980s and ‘90s. 
Currently, NYC agencies tasked with CI are reactive as well. This thesis recommends a 
communication system to ensure proactive collaboration. The tactics employed in 
CompStat include addressing emerging issues as they arise and using multi-faceted 
proactive approaches to address them. The application of this principle to bridge and road 
repair includes prioritization of projects and a study of materials used to ensure 
effectiveness. Similar to the change in policing methods, this approach removes the 
reactive function of repair and strives towards proactive monitoring and repair. 
3. Rapid Deployment 
The third principle of CompStat, rapid deployment, prevented incidents in the 
NYPD’s model—decreasing crime. Deploying city agencies responsible for CI, correctly, 
and in collaboration, will likely decrease incidents of road deterioration, traffic, and 
emergencies. In policing, using the accurate intelligence and the correct enforcement-
strategies personnel can be allocated to areas of events. Rapid deployment is applicable in 
the reactive necessities of policing to prevent future incidents or retaliatory action.  
In the proactive aspect, rapid deployment is used to gather intelligence and 
circumvent activities that may lead to criminal activity. Deployment may mean 
attendance at community meetings to disseminate crime prevention materials or physical 
changes, such as lighting or security facilities. The rapid deployment is an internal 
strategy, also. Monitoring personnel issues, disciplinary action against officers, overtime 
usage, sick time usage, and other NYPD programs creates a better-rounded agency.  
In the model applicable to CI, the need is for prioritization as well as rapid 
deployment. City agencies have limited resources and money. Therefore, projects and 
initiatives need to be prioritized to ensure issues are tended to before they become larger 
and require more money and resources. 
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4. Relentless Follow-up and Assessment 
Relentless follow-up and assessment is the most important aspect of the CompStat 
process or any performance-measurement related strategy; as such, it is also the most 
important aspect of implementing the CompStat strategy into critical infrastructure 
improvement. The follow-up phase is the recapitulation, which focuses on accountability. 
As the first Deputy Commissioner of Operations, Jack Maple, stated, “Nobody ever got 
in trouble because crime numbers on their watch went up…Trouble arose only if the 
commanders didn’t know why the numbers were up or didn’t have a plan to address the 
problems.”195 This philosophy increases the attentiveness of precinct commanders. A 
quantitative analysis is the easiest way to track the outcome of CompStat, decreased 
criminal activity and increased police activity; summonses and arrests. A qualitative 
analysis is also useful. Did the plan work? Why or why not? What aspects of the plan will 
be used in the future plan or the next plan for the next incident? Complaints from the 
community can also be tracked, monitored, and followed-up on to determine success. The 
citizens’ perception of order versus lawlessness is a guiding factor to the success of the 
precinct or the police as a whole. In the model recommended in this thesis, the citizens’ 
perception of safe CI leads to reassurance in government. 
These four principles, as simple as they seem, revolutionized the way police work 
was conducted in New York City, followed by a majority of the country, then disciplines 
outside of law enforcement, by collecting intelligence, using better tactics, deploying the 
right resources to the right locations, and following up on performance. This thesis uses the 
four principles to recommend a methodology for applying these principles to the subject of 
critical infrastructure improvement focusing on bridge and roadway repair in New York 
City. 
C. MEETING 
Designing a potential NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure CompStat Unit 
requires understanding the meeting format and forum to incorporate and display the four 
principles correctly. The CompStat meeting itself is only a small part of the CompStat 
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philosophy. CompStat is not one day or one meeting. CompStat is daily and starts the 
second you leave the CompStat meeting. The meeting is the culmination of the plans you 
have put in place and the accountability for their successes or failures. It is also the 
podium to discuss future programs and deployments. 
Weekly CompStat meetings are the means by which agency leaders can 
analyze and evaluate the overall trends in all key crime indicators and risk 
management issues. They provide the opportunity for ongoing follow-up 
and assessment and, just as important, serve to reaffirm responsibility and 
ownership of crime problems within a command’s purview as well as 
those that cross jurisdictional boundaries.196 
The meeting, sometimes called “the show,” is the culmination of all monitoring activities 
and the podium is the sounding board for the commanders to present their knowledge and 
leadership, their commitment to improvement and safety. 
The five geographic boroughs of New York City—Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, 
Bronx, and Staten Island—are divided into eight Patrol Boroughs by the NYPD. The 
NYPD separates Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens into a North and South sections to 
better manage the size, geography, and number of precincts. A precinct is a geographic 
area supervised by a Commanding Officer and overseen by a Patrol Borough 
Commander. Except for Staten Island, Patrol Boroughs have approximately eight to 
thirteen precincts contained therein. 
Weekly, a different Patrol Borough will be called to CompStat. The meeting is 
always Thursday from 8 am until 11 am in Police Headquarters. On Monday, a borough 
is selected based on the previous week’s crimes or major incidents and a list of cases is 
sent out through the entire department. Those cases are complaints of crimes and contain 
all the documentation done by the responsible investigative unit. At the meeting, the 
upper echelon of the NYPD sits at the front dais, the Chief of Department, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Operations and the Chiefs of all Bureaus, namely Patrol, Housing, 
Transit, Detectives, Organized Crime, Community Affairs, and Training. On the arms of 
the horseshoe-shaped table sit the Borough Commanders and their staff as well as the 
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Precinct Commanders and his/her respective staff. Members of other NYPD units that 
may have a stake in the cases and precincts occupy the rest of the room. Examples of 
these include Robbery Squads, Gang Division personnel, Financial Crimes, Gun 
Suppression units, and my own Special Victims Division. The reason to have these sub-
units present is to address overlapping issues or perpetrators. Non-NYPD units such as 
the District Attorney’s Office, Department of Parole, and Department of Probation attend 
to answer any questions relating to their particular expertise.  
The Chief of Department calls an average of three precincts to present at the 
podium per CompStat; this system can be duplicated into CI by including the agencies 
responsible for CI improvements into the meeting, but only having specific agencies 
present their progress. The Precinct Commanders, their subordinates, and sub-units 
provide an overview of their precincts and answer specific questions posed by the 
speaker at the dais. This referenced design and format is that which the NYPD employs, 
research has shown that different departments and disciplines perform their respective 
stat meetings differently. 
In seeking to replicate the NYPD’s CompStat model, many agencies have 
accepted invitations to attend the meeting in person, demonstrating their recognition of its 
success. A survey completed in 1999 “revealed that a third of the nation’s 515 largest 
police departments had implemented a CompStat-like programme and 20% were 
planning to do so by 2001. The same survey found that about 70% of police departments 
with CompStat programmes reported attending an NYPD CompStat meeting.”197 Some 
research indicates the failure of agencies to adopt a successful CompStat model is due to 
reliance on the meeting without the full-time monitoring of conditions and daily follow-
up  
Chapter VI discusses the development of the CompStat Unit for CI regarding the 
location, division, and subdivision of various city agencies that might be involved in the 
process. Figure 30 shows the physical positioning of the CompStat Dais. The Chief of 
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Department and DCO sit at the center of the dais and share responsibilities of questioning 
attendees. 
Figure 30. CompStat Dais Overview198 
 
Figures 31 and 32 depict the size of the CompStat room and the positioning of 
members for maximum visibility. The Commanding Officer and precinct’s management 
team present to the upper echelon from the CompStat podium.199 These figures serve as 
a display of layout and, in the model recommended by this thesis, could be used as a 
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guide. It is anticipated that fewer members would be present in the NYC Mayor’s Office 
of Infrastructure CompStat meeting. 
Figure 31. CompStat Dais200 
 
Figure 32. CompStat Podium201 
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Figures 31 and 32 depict the size, structure, and set up of the NYPD’s CompStat meeting 
room. The layout is similar to other agencies’ CompStat models and creates an 
atmosphere necessary to the function.  
D. COSTS, TECHNOLOGY, AND STAFFING 
Developing the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure’s CompStat Unit would 
require office space, a meeting space, computers and software, and the personnel to 
effectively apply the four CompStat principles to CI. City agencies currently monitor 
their respective projects but in a silo-driven system that does not allow for collaboration 
with other agencies or private companies. Chapter VI addresses the design of the office 
and meeting room as duplicated from the NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner of Operations’ 
(DCO) office. 
The DCO moderates CompStat, making him/her fourth in ranking structure and 
equal to the Bureau Chiefs who sit at his/her side at CompStat meetings. All rank under 
the Chief of Department whose purview covers the entire department. An NYPD 
Inspector supervises the Office of the DCO; the Inspector’s position is essential to the 
operation of the office. Precinct commanders are usually deputy inspectors or captains; 
therefore, no precinct commander outranks the Inspector in the DCO’s Office  
The primary function of the members of the DCO’s office is to analyze the 
100,000-plus index crimes that occur in NYC yearly and prepare reports to the Chief of 
Department and the DCO. These reports include investigative work, historical 
breakdowns of the victim, perpetrator, and location.202 Their work also involves other 
clerical and internal issues of managing the NYPD, such as complaints against officers, 
sick leave, overtime, and quality of life Complaints. The yearly salary for the 40 
members of the DCO’s office is approximately $4 million203—a staggering amount, yet 
their job function is and will be different from the citywide model proposed. The 
respective city agencies already have representatives tasked with tracking initiatives and 
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projects and also support the computer terminals and databases required by this 
recommendation. 
This thesis recommends the creation of a NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure 
with a CompStat component; to do so, the NYPDs CompStat model and those adapted by 
other agencies and disciplines must be studied to design the space, format, and 
methodology. Next, this thesis describes other CompStat-style performance management 
models and the grouping of all models into a system of accountability. 
E. OTHER USES OF COMPSTAT  
This thesis recommends development of an NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure 
CompStat Unit based on the NYPD’s CompStat model as described in the previous 
section. This section details other applicable uses of the CompStat model by agencies in 
New York City. In 1984, the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation began 
the Parks Inspection Program (PIP) to monitor its performance internally. PIP started out 
as a review conducted three times a year, but, in 1995, it was changed to a bi-weekly 
randomly selected inspection location and a follow-up meeting to the meeting before.204 
NYC Parks changed the meeting name in 1997 to ParkStat, and, in one meeting, a park 
manager told the executive moderating the meeting that an issue with his park was due to 
the Department of Transportation (DOT) not promptly repairing a roadway under his 
control but within a park. The moderator’s follow-up question was, “How can we put 
more pressure on DOT—what can be done at a higher level?”205 That moderator saw the 
potential of incorporating multiple agencies into one meeting in an attempt to create 
positive change. 
Another adaptation of the CompStat model into other NYC agencies is 
HealthStat, a program that began in New York City in 2000 to ensure all eligible New 
Yorkers, especially children, are enrolled in state and federal health programs. The 
program incorporated different NYC agencies: the Department of Health, the Housing 
Authority, the Human Resource Administration, the Board of Education, and others 
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reporting to the Deputy Mayor of Health Care Access. An unlikely partner agency that 
provided the most information was the Department of Corrections. Daily, thousands of 
New Yorkers enter Riker’s Island Correctional Facility, both as defendants and family 
members visiting incarcerated members.206 This system allowed access to those most 
vulnerable to lacking health care coverage.207 Research shows that HealthStat is the only 
multi-agency meeting to be held in New York City with a common goal, making it an 
ideal stat to look to for creation of the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure. 
Baltimore, Maryland, has succeeded with the only documented multi-agency 
PerformanceStat program. Soon after the NYPD’s CompStat was introduced, the 
Baltimore mayor tapped Jack Maple, the architect of the NYPD’s CompStat, to design a 
citywide program for Baltimore called Citistat. In addition to crime reduction, Baltimore 
also experienced decreased overtime in city agencies and cleaner public parks.208 In 
documenting the results, the program has also yielded qualitative results such as 
expedited movement on problems and better interagency collaboration.209  
Adapting CompStat principles to other agencies or cities has proven to be 
successful. ParkStat continues today, and Citistat has saved money by monitoring 
different aspects of city government in one forum. HealthStat, as a temporary system, 
coordinated agencies under the direction of mayor’s office. Combining interconnected 
disciplines of CI into one mayor’s office can yield the same results and improvements. 
F. PERFORMANCESTAT MODELS 
This thesis recommends that NYC develop a CI CompStat using methodology 
developed by performance management researcher Robert Behn. Behn studied various 
CompStat programs from different cities and disciplines, combining them into a 
performance management system called PerformanceStat.210 His research presents a 
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format to be followed to ensure a successful CompStat-type meeting. The NYPD was the 
first organization to establish CompStat in 1994, with many organizations and disciplines 
following. All models of PerformanceStat should be studied to ensure success and avoid 
failures in developing an office for CI CompStat. 
A jurisdiction or agency is employing a PerformanceStat performance 
strategy if it holds an ongoing series of regular, frequent, periodic, 
integrated meetings during which the chief executive and/or the principal 
members of the chief executive’s leadership team plus the individual 
director (and the top managers) of different subunits use data to analyze 
the unit’s past performance, to follow up on previous decisions and 
commitments to improve performance, to establish its next performance 
objectives, and to examine the effectiveness of its overall performance 
strategies.211 
Behn acknowledges that the most important aspects of CompStat meetings are “two key 
pieces of infrastructure: (a) some technology to help collect, analyze, and display the data 
and (b) a room in which to hold the periodic meetings,”212 but also addresses the 
authority and full-time position of the moderator and the dedication of all attendees. 
For stat (CompStat, PerformanceStat, or similar model) success, primarily, those 
attending the meeting or adhering to the process must understand that the signals 
communicated are coming from the highest levels of the organization or the highest 
levels of city government in those stats that involve multiple agencies. “No precinct 
commander doubted that Anemone and Maple had Bratton’s full backing. In Baltimore, 
no department head doubted that Enright and Gallagher spoke for the mayor.”213 The 
highest rank present at the CompStat meeting must communicate the same authority and 
purpose as the absent higher ranks, as such, in the model recommended by this thesis, the 
mayor need not regularly attend, but all attendees must know that the moderator is 
speaking with his/her authority. 
Secondly, Behn’s research shows that agencies with the best rates of success staff 
their PerformanceStat office full-time. In the NYPD’s CompStat program, the Deputy 
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Commissioner of Operations (DCO) is a full-time employee whose only job function is 
CompStat. The NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure CompStat Unit requires a member 
permanently assigned and whose hierarchical status is higher than or equal to the agency 
commissioners. 
A third key aspect of the Behn-related research is ensuring the stamina to keep the 
program progressing even though results may not be immediate. In the agencies and 
locations studied, Palmer, a doctoral candidate at UNC–Chapel Hill noted there was an 
average of three years before significant progress can be noted.214 In a recent CompStat 
meeting, the DCO stated that the stamina to begin and continue a CompStat program is 
critical to success and the inability to continue that stamina is most often the reason for 
program failure.  
To maintain a successful CompStat meeting, a respectful, interactive back and 
forth between the Deputy Commissioner of Operations and the subordinate member 
presenting is necessary. Following this model, the moderator of the NYC Deputy Mayor 
of Infrastructure CompStat Unit and the presenter must adhere to the four principles 
while discussing past incidents and future deployments. Behn also states, “the meeting 
can evolve into a game. The leadership plays gotcha, while the subunit participants 
respond by attempting to score debating points, devoting their time to anticipating and 
rebutting the gotcha questions. In the gotcha game, no one is attempting to actually 
improve performance”215 Rather than acting as if CI is a game, presenters must believe 
in the methodology to enable true improvements and the questioning members at the dais 
must maintain professional decorum to promote true accountability. 
To promote city government transparency, some researchers have studied the 
ability of PerformanceStat to function open to public viewing, without limiting 
conversation. In law enforcement–related PerformanceStats, some topics and initiatives 
are ongoing and open investigations are a concern. Many public managers are reluctant to 
engage in open conversation in public. As one manager noted, “If we are having a 
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conversation about the police department, the police chief would be willing to admit his 
department dropped the ball, but that would never happen with the press in the room.”216 
Unlike law enforcement, issues presented at PerformanceStats, CompStat, or a CompStat 
for CI are meant for public viewing. 
Behn summarizes the creation of a PerformanceStat system as follows: 
To make an intelligent use of the PerformanceStat strategy, the leaders of 
the adopting organization need to (a) specify the performance purpose 
they are trying to achieve; (b) decide what performance data they will 
collect and analyze; (c) build a small staff to analyze these data; (d) 
assemble the necessary infrastructure; (e) determine how they will conduct 
the meetings; (f) build the requisite operational capacity; (g) create an 
explicit mechanism to follow up on the problems identified, solutions 
proposed, and decisions made at these meetings; and (h) think through 
carefully how they adapt the features and principles of other versions of 
PerformanceStat to their own purpose and situation.217 
Following the format of PerformanceStat described in this chapter, the NYC 
Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure CompStat will moderate, promote communication 
between agencies, and create greater improvement in CI. Chapter VI discusses the 
particular structure of the office. 
G. CRITIQUES OF COMPSTAT MODELS 
In adapting the CompStat principles to CI improvement, it is important to note 
that the philosophy is not without critiques of its successes and methodology. The 
preceding sections point to the successes of the program and later chapters describe how 
to implement the system in the world of CI protection; however, criticisms are divided 
into three categories: inflated numbers and unconstitutional practices, factors causing 
lower crime rates, and the costs to the morale of the organization. As retired NYPD 
captain Phil Eterno and CompStat researcher Eli Silverman wrote, “the weaknesses of 
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CompStat are less recognised: due process considerations, community relations, 
leadership issues, [and] inadequate problem solving.”218 
The questioning of commanders regarding crime increase and its relation to 
activity levels by police officers is alleged to have caused commanders to demand more 
activity.219 The demand was sometimes misconstrued as a “by any means necessary 
approach” leading to unconstitutional stops. Others attribute CompStat demands to more 
aggressive tactics, and the increase in Stop and Frisk incidents to document said stop as 
proof of activity for crime conditions.220 W. K. Rashbaum wrote an article for the New 
York Times in 1996 that cited, “Civilian complaints against police for allegedly illegal 
searches skyrocketed by 135% in the first two years….Illegal vehicle searches 
jumped…108%…[and] allegations of illegal apartment searches shot up 179%.’”221 
Eterno and Silverman added, “Thus, as crime decreased, civilian complaints for abuse of 
authority increased. This negative relationship is certainly glaring but only one of several 
measures indicating a problem.”222 
The second critique questions whether CompStat was truly the reason for the 
massive crime reductions cited. Some research points to other reasons for declining crime 
rates:  
• Demographic change—This hypothesis states that the offenders of serious 
crimes aged out of the demographic that would commit such crimes.223  
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• More police—Due to economic prosperity larger cities had more money to 
expand police departments, some, such as New York City, supplemented 
by federal money.224 
• Changing drug markets—Outdoor drug markets relocated to indoor 
locations thereby eliminating the ability to attack rival drug dealers.225 
One would argue that the technological advancements of cellular phones 
and social media also led to greater declines. 
• Increased abortion—Due to the increased rates of abortion in the early to 
mid-1970s, fewer children were born into at-risk homes, thus there were 
fewer children growing up into an at-risk household and susceptible to 
gang and drug activity.226 
Social scientists insisting on varying reasons for crime rates decreasing diminish 
the involvement of the NYPD in the process. Arrest activity increased, structured 
analyzed placement of personnel occurred, and crime rates dropped. These factors do not 
relate to CI or Homeland Security, but serve as reminders that contrary research always 
exists. 
In adapting the CompStat principles to CI and creating the NYC Deputy Mayor of 
Infrastructure, an agency submitting fraudulent numbers and reports is a concern, but a 
larger concern is the morale of the agency and the organizational behavior of adapting to 
sweeping change. Research, interviews, and surveys all indicate that the negative 
attributes of CompStat induced fear, alienation, and misdirection to precinct 
commanders. Studies have shown that poor performance at a CompStat meeting or poor 
indicators in CompStat categories has resulted in “punishment,” yet good performances 
and indicators rarely generate a reward.227  
Relating back to Behn’s PerformanceStat, he found that follow-up must be 
relentless as the fourth principle states, but should not be hostile, stating “follow-up is 
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absolutely necessary, and it ought to be persistent.”228 To document the loss of morale, 
Eterno and Silverman interviewed captains who presented at CompStat and stated that 
they “feared embarrassment during their presentations…high-level Executives would 
berate them in public if their crime numbers were not decreasing…commanding officers 
feared presenting at CompStat meetings and would do almost anything to escape the 
embarrassment…fear was observed as a central aspect of CompStat in New York 
City.”229 To create improvements, implementing CompStat in CI must be professional 
and not induce fear. Based on personal observations, the mood in a CompStat meeting 
fluctuates based on spectators present. Holding the meeting publicly or having media 
presence may force the professional demeanor to be maintained  
Research done as well as personal observations indicate that the strong hierarchal 
structure of the NYPD leads to the successes of CompStat. There is no doubt who is in 
command of the proceeding and the department. As Eterno and Silverman detailed, 
embarrassment and fear are motivators to ensure better performance on subsequent visits, 
and when directed to perform tasks or report back successes and failures, there is not the 
ability to say no or just fail to do so. Weisburd, a criminologist, adds, “This supervisory 
system is strongly hierarchical and essentially negative, relying primarily on sanctions for 
noncompliance with police rules and regulations,”230 and that CompStat is an “effort to 
maintain and reinforce the ‘bureaucratic ‘or ‘paramilitary’ model of police 
organization.”231 Weisburd’s work does not reflect the fact that a strong supervisory 
system, such as CompStat, also increases accountability. 
Overall, as the rates of crime reduction overshadow the negative aspects of 
CompStat, promoting safety in CI through improved communication, collaboration, and 
accountability will enable the success of the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure’s office. 
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This chapter provided an overview of the origination of CompStat: its principles, 
format, national models, and critiques. As observed in the research, the NYPD began the 
CompStat model; research and personal observations demonstrate that the NYPD is still 
at the forefront of the CompStat dynamic, adapting the design as times change. Eterno 
and Silverman look to the future of CompStat and determine that “the NYPD needs to 
acknowledge and learn from weaknesses in the process and begin to develop models of 
policing that will take into account lessons learned.”232 
Basic models of the stat process should be adhered to, but varying the structure 
allows applicability to other agencies and disciplines. Eterno and Silverman close their 
paper by citing the positive aspects of efficiency, command structure, expectations of 
workers, and reduction of bias. Also included are the negative aspects of depriving 
employees of having a decision-making voice, the concealment of mistakes, discouraging 
loyalty, and alienation.233 The stat process as described earlier is a model of planning 
and accountability to allocate resources efficiently. It cannot be viewed as a process to 
take a poorly supervised agency or disconnected agencies and force better results.  
In 1998, First Deputy Mayor Joseph Lhota stated, “It [the stat process] can be 
used in any area of government. The fact that it was developed in the public safety area 
does not mean that it has to stay there.”234 Following this sentiment, the creation of the 
Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure with a CompStat component can have the same degree 
of improvement as CompStat had in the NYPD. Chapter VI discusses the methodology of 
creating the Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure and designing a CompStat model within. 
 
                                                 
232 Eterno and Silverman, The New York City Police Department's Compstat, 229.  
233 Ibid.,227. 
234 O’Connell, Using Performance Data for Accountability, 179–223. 
 94 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 95 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Another definition of accountability is: the act of holding the subordinate 
liable for performing those activities for which he or she has been 
delegated the necessary authority and responsibility. 
 
—Louis Eugene Boone, James W. Baird,  
David Lee Kurtz, and Israel B. Markowitz235 
 
Accountability and communication are two crucial aspects of the CompStat 
process, both also particularly key to solve the needs surrounding NYC critical 
infrastructure (NYC CI). Chapter V discussed the NYPD’s CompStat program, including 
its successes and flaws. Chapter VI develops the strategy of implementing the CompStat 
principles into NYC CI plans to increase accountability, communication, and prioritization. 
The proposed system prioritizes cost-effective improvements and homeland security, 
specifically CI, by enabling quicker emergency response and ability to evacuate if 
necessary.  
A. INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NYC CI 
Currently, monitoring and assessing city agencies occurs in the NYC Mayor’s 
Office of Operations; coordination of agencies for emergency incident response is 
overseen by New York City Emergency Management (NYC EM). This thesis 
recommends moving CI concerns from the Mayor’s Office of Operations into a newly 
created Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure (DMI) Office and creating a CompStat Unit 
within that office to collaborate with NYC EM to measure the performance of agencies 
and ensure communication. 
The Mayor’s Office of Operations and New York City Emergency Management 
currently have overlapping responsibilities. Although both agencies oversee collaboration 
in multi-agency response, as depicted in Figure 33, Emergency Management is better at 
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multi-agency coordination post-event, than the Mayor’s Office of Operations has been 
pre-event. This thesis recommends creation of the DMI to enable true collaboration, 
communication, and accountability. 
Figure 33.  Overlapping Mission Statements 
 
The current structure, as shown in Figure 33, causes duplicate work and important 
issues to not be addressed in a timely manner due to communication and accountability 
failures. This thesis recommends developing an accountability model to improve CI. 
The structure of New York City government begins with the mayor, then the first 
deputy mayor, and then additional deputy mayors who are on par with commissioners of 
city agencies. Under this plan, the city would create a position of the deputy mayor of 
critical infrastructure. Creating a deputy mayor of critical infrastructure is not just 
creating more and bigger government. The NYC mayor has offices to combat domestic 
violence, for housing and economic development, and health and human services; 
therefore, if a system is failing, it needs to be brought into the forefront to be closely 
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monitored. The structure proposed follows the NYPD model where the person, or office, 
directing the CompStat process has higher authority than those presenting for their 
respective agency, increasing accountability. 
The current NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations, headed by a director, “works to 
make a government of over 40 agencies and 300,000 employees more effective, efficient, 
and coordinated in carrying out its day-to-day business,”236 and also “monitors the 
performance of all City agencies, holding each agency accountable for providing high 
quality services and making data about the City’s performance readily available to the 
public.”237 Information retrieved from their website reports increasing or decreasing 
performance in numerous indicators per agency; the NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations 
reports this information via the Citywide Performance Reporting (CPR) tool.238 The 
CPR tool combines city agencies into eight citywide themes, including public safety, 
legal affairs, education, and infrastructure. The infrastructure theme combines reports on 
city agencies tasked with infrastructure but fails to define collaboration, coordination, or 
accountability and also fails to encourage participation of private companies.  
The Mayor’s Office of Operations website details how agency information is 
collected but does not explain any collaborative efforts. The Performance Management 
Team “monitors and reports on the performance of all City agencies, holding each agency 
accountable for providing high quality services,” by maintaining the Citywide 
Performance Reporting (CPR) tool, a searchable online database presenting key 
performance measures from 44 city agencies.239 The Performance Management Team 
also issues the bi-annual Mayor’s Management Report. The first report, issued early in 
the fiscal year, defines the direction the city intends to go, while the second, issued after 
the fiscal year ended, gives a recap of progress. 
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NYC Emergency Management, headed by a commissioner, coordinates mitigation 
efforts after emergency events. The agency has different sections to handle various 
functions of city government and different categories of emergency. These divisions form 
the structure for collaboration in pre-event planning discussed in this thesis. New York 
City’s Emergency Management began as the New York office of the federal Office of 
Civil Defense in 1941.240 In 1950, it became a New York City agency and has developed 
under many incarnations since then, most notably as a subunit of the NYPD in 1975 and 
the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) in 1996 by Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani. Under current Mayor Bill DeBlasio, NYC OEM has been renamed New York 
City Emergency Management (NYC EM) as a rebranding to increase public awareness of 
the organization and get the public’s assistance in coordination and preparedness.241  
Similar rebranding of city agencies, like creating Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure, 
could improve CI. The NYC EM mission statement explains that the agency “plans and 
prepares for emergencies, educates the public about preparedness, coordinates emergency 
response and recovery, and collects and disseminates emergency information.”242 The 
author would be remiss in ignoring that, while the agency description and presentations 
by the NYC EM commissioner and chief of staff stresses the term emergency, the type of 
multi-agency communication recommended within does not currently fall under their 
purview, therefore creating the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure in collaboration with 
NYC EM would enhance the accountability of agencies and companies in the 
infrastructure discipline.  
NYC Emergency Management is divided into nine different divisions covering 
post-event scenarios, each division combines interconnected agencies. This thesis focuses 
on the Planning and Preparedness Division and the Transportation and Infrastructure Unit 
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housed therein.243 The Transportation Unit “strengthens the resiliency of New York 
City’s massive power, telecommunications, water, and transportation infrastructure 
during disasters through response, recovery, and mitigation planning.”244 Under the plan 
proposed in this thesis, when collaborating with the Deputy Mayor’s Office of 
Infrastructure, the phrase “during disasters” can be removed revealing a section of the 
agency concerning itself with “strengthening the resiliency of New York City’s massive 
power, telecommunications, water, and transportation infrastructure through response, 
recovery, and mitigation planning.” 
New York City Emergency Management also developed emergency support 
functions (ESF) to be commensurate with FEMA. FEMA’s ESF details different 
functions, such as transportation, communications, and firefighting, describing the types 
of work and responses that fall into those categories. NYC EM developed a listing of city 
agencies, state agencies, and private corporations that fall under their purview, as subject 
matter groups. These groups control, organize and regulate necessary functions to help 
continue normal basic life in and recovery from emergency incidents. Examples of these 
are the Health & Medical ESF, Public Safety ESF, Transportation ESF, and Infrastructure 
ESF.  
B. INCREASED COMMUNICATION FOR NYC CI 
The description of NYC EM indicates the functionality of the ESF collaboration 
in a post-event scenario, such as grouping together interconnected agencies in the CI 
discipline. Developing a performance management operation within the NYC Deputy 
Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure collaboration with NYC EM would bring together the 
interests of the agencies represented in this thesis. NYC EM’s Transportation ESF covers 
rail and bus transit, NYC Department of Transportation, NYS Department of 
Transportation, Taxi Commission, and representatives from areas outside of New York 
City. The NYC EM Infrastructure ESF covers the Department of Design and 
                                                 




Construction, Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Parks, and similar 
agencies from other jurisdictions. These ESFs open jointly or as single units as necessary 
during a post-incident joint operation, and form the model for a CompStat meeting when 
combined with the Mayor’s Office of Operations Infrastructure Theme in the Deputy 
Mayor of Infrastructure Office (DMI). 
Forming a CompStat analysis section within the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure 
Office and working with NYC EM enables communication, monitoring, and 
accountability. The Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure could coordinate the CompStat 
processes of setting up the technology, meeting space, and scheduling. A rank structure 
similar to the NYPD enables oversight, maintains accountability, and provides a 
hierarchal system to ensure compliance with mayoral orders. The Deputy Mayor of 
Infrastructure can examine CompStat for its strengths and weaknesses, and apply lessons 
learned to strengthen and enhance disaster preparedness on an everyday level. The 
hierarchy outlined in Figure 29 is essential to the CompStat meeting design. The Police 
Commissioner rarely attends, and if so to announce new initiatives or hear an overview of 
the presentation. CompStat is under the direction under the Chief of Department and 
tasked to the Deputy Commissioner of Operations (DCO). The DCO is on the same level 
of authority as the Bureau Chiefs which is important as the DCO and Bureau Chiefs are 
in a physical and authoritative position to question subordinates. The Deputy Mayor of 
Infrastructure would assume a position similar to the NYPD’s Chief of Department and 
designate a position similar to the NYPD’s DCO in the duplicated model for CI, as 








Figure 34. Hierarchy of CompStat Model and the Mayor’s Office 
of Infrastructure Model 
 
This thesis recommends taking infrastructure concerns off the overburdened plate 
of Mayor’s Office of Operations and create a new Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure to 
collaborate with New York City’s Emergency Management. The current New York City 
Commissioner of Emergency Management is Joseph Esposito, who is a former Chief of 
Department for the New York City Police Department. In that assignment, he 
commanded the CompStat process for 13 years (2000–2013). Commissioner Esposito’s 
experience commanding CompStat and NYC EM will be immensely valuable in the 
transition process. His experience in ensuring communication and accountability in the 
NYPD would translate well into the new collaboration of NYC EM and the Mayor’s 
Office of Infrastructure, and we would have all hands on deck to improve CI. 
The goal of introducing CompStat principles to CI is to enable agencies to adapt 
to the constant cycle of the CompStat principles, collecting intelligence, tactics/ 
deployment, and, most importantly, follow-up. The duality of the CompStat process is the 
pre-planning or initiative phase and the follow-up phase. In pre-planning, commanding 
officers make plans while the follow-up phase focuses on the accountability aspect of 
critiquing actions and plans whether positive or negative. The culmination of the 
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CompStat process is the CompStat meeting, but both the leaders at the dais and the 
presenting units engage in pre-CompStat meetings, resulting in the coordination of 
efforts. For the dais, the DCOs office and the respective Bureau chiefs meet a day before 
CompStat to discuss the highlighted issues for CompStat. This meeting ensures CompStat 
discussion of the most relevant topics, as well as how to limit the session to an acceptable 
length. The presenters, mostly precinct personnel, will meet during the week leading up 
to CompStat to discuss the issues observed. On the day before CompStat, those units will 
be called down to present the observations to the borough chief of the respective borough 
presenting. This process applies to other units such as detective squads, robbery squads, 
etc., who anticipate presenting at CompStat. 
This pre-CompStat process is carried on by some successful borough chiefs or 
unit commanding officers regularly with little influence of the CompStat schedule, 
ensuring that communication and the principles of CompStat are adhered to daily. Under 
a system of regular pre-CompStat meetings, members are kept apprised of issues and 
monitor performance typically called into question at a real CompStat. Frequently, issues 
discussed at pre-CompStats will not make it onto the agenda at the CompStat meeting 
due to time constraints and level of importance. The pre-CompStat meeting ensures that 
all issues are being looked at and under the direction of the borough commander. 
This model develops a pre-meeting into each agency conducting respective mini-
CompStats. Subordinates brief agency heads on issues that may arise at CompStat and the 
agency head instructs subordinates on issues observed. This system translates into mini-
CompStats off the CompStat schedule that create a system of accountability through the 
year. 
C. PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO NYC CI 
Chapter V delineated the NYPD’s CompStat model and the four principles that 
define the process; the next section explains how we can apply those to the Mayor’s 
Office of Infrastructure. Adapting those four principles to the recommended Deputy 
Mayor of Infrastructure provides a methodology to coordinate multi-agency cooperation 
although organizational behavior will need to adjust. 
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1. Accurate and Timely Intelligence  
Collection of intelligence is an agency-centric design that is already occurring but 
needs to be analyzed and compared to other agencies. Accurate and timely intelligence is 
a natural aspect of CompStat model for a citywide multi-agency application. In 2003, 
New York City Department of Information Technology and Communications (NYC 
DoITT) created the 311 quality-of-life hotline system. Customers can call to get 
information or make complaints about hundreds of issues such as garbage collections, 
alternate side parking, and noise. Originally intended to alleviate traffic to the 911 
emergency dispatch system, 311 has become a repository for searchable requests 
documented and issued a unique identifying number for follow-up. The 311 system 
averages 10 million calls a year and provides services in 170 languages. Since the 
creation of the 311 system, NYC DoITT has added a 311 website and apps for iOS-, 
Android-, and Windows-operated cellular phones. The volume of calls and methods of 
contact demonstrate the usage rate and the access that citizens have. The complaints are 
collected and forwarded to respective agencies for action and replies are stored in the 311 
system. The intelligence is being collected and used but not compared against 
information from other agencies.  
In preparation for research on this thesis, I attended meetings and seminars on 
critical infrastructure by several government representatives from New York City 
Council, New York State Assembly, and the Staten Island Borough President. All 
presenters had no shortage of stories of governmental failure in improving infrastructure 
in a prioritized manner. These officials, currently the repository of failures, can also be a 
source of intelligence to the respective agencies. The incidents depicted Chapter IV all 
indicate a need for oversight, communication, and accountability. 
2. Effective Tactics 
Effective tactics in the CI model come in the form of civilian agencies and 
industry representatives to discuss new technologies and initiatives with city agencies 
responsible for improvements. In the NYPD’s CompStat meetings, outside agencies are 
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invited to come and observe and participate. Also, NYPD units provide demonstrations 
on new tactics and equipment.  
Effective tactics tie in with rapid deployment. Rating systems are in place and 
demonstrated in previous sections of this thesis. The American Society of Civil 
Engineers, the NYC DOT, the Rudin Center, TRIP, Center for an Urban Future all use 
the same collected rating systems to indicate which roadway or bridge needs repair first. 
This information and the presence of those groups at CompStat would enforce the 
prioritization.  
3. Rapid Deployment 
Rapid deployment coupled with effective tactics relies on taking the intelligence, 
developing a plan to address it, and getting to it quickly based on priority. PlowNYC is a 
website to enable citizens to track the progress of snow removal vehicles and to 
determine the rating of their street in the priority removal order—primary, secondary, and 
tertiary.245 
The pre-event planning aspect of CompStat would enable joint rapid deployment 
by agency representatives engaging in conversation about processes of their respective 
organizations. Utility companies in New York City—Con Edison, National Grid, and 
Verizon—have a plan in place in which they confer on upcoming projects. As a result, 
the agencies can work together in one area, work more efficiently, reduce traffic 
congestion, and save money. City agencies do not currently have a similar plan unless the 
work comes under the Department of Design and Constriction Capital Projects.  
4. Relentless Follow-up 
Relentless follow-up is the tricky part. Developing a system where one person 
with the authority of the mayor and can question city agencies could cause a hostile 
environment. The goal is to encourage free conversation between agencies. The planning 
phase of the meeting should be a moderated discussion between agencies. The follow-up 
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and accountability phase does not have to be punitive but can be taken with the authority 
of the Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure. Being witness to hundreds of CompStat 
presentations, I can testify to the resistance of some. Precinct commanders and borough 
commanders unwilling to participate in the NYPD’s 1994 CompStat retired or adapted. 
The result was and still is a massive well-documented decrease in crime. The result of 
this recommendation is a vastly improved system of government-supervised 
infrastructure. 
5. Limitations 
Researching the CompStat process, the state of critical infrastructure, and a 
method of applying CompStat principles to CI uncovered limitations. The origination of 
CompStat in 1994 was not without setbacks, retirements, and transfers. The government 
is known to work in its silo-based system with little change from the previous 
administration, regime, or generation. A conversion of that mindset into the NYPD’s 
team mentality is necessary. Accountability and measurement are keys to successes, 
recognition, and promotion of those who excel. 
6. Summary 
The recommendation of this thesis is to incorporate agencies and commissioners 
along the ESF structure. This grouping would enable commissioners in compatible or 
related fields to be grouped together for presentation at the NYC Deputy Mayor of 
Infrastructure’s CompStat. The quotes in the Chapter II Section B and in Chapter V of 
this thesis display that CompStat is not without its downsides. It can be aggressive, 
confrontational, and sometimes demeaning, and documentation exists of attempts to 
report false numbers to make the appearance of declining crime. The positive outcomes 
of reduced crime and increased quality of life greatly outweigh the negative.  
The CompStat process is not a panacea. It is not a magical cure-all that 
will transform a poorly run and inefficient organization into a model of 
public service excellence. Rather, it is an additional tool that can be used 
 106 
to enhance performance by means of careful measurement and planning 
and effective allocation of resources.246 
CompStat requires, fosters, and forces buy-in by all involved. It is a system to 
build a hard-working team around a mission. Applying the CompStat principles to CI 
would create similar partnership in all agencies involved in particular disciplines. 
This thesis details hierarchies of authority in both the NYPD and the city of New 
York. When the discussion relates to public safety, public infrastructure, and using tax 
money to ensure both, the real bosses are the citizens of New York City. The ultimate 
goal of this thesis is to create a fair system of accountability in which citizens can witness 
the transparency and interact with the system in place. The CompStat system has 
punished and rewarded members. This recommended system must gain success with 
limited punishment and much public praise. 
Democratic governments are also obligated to be accountable to their 
owners—the citizenry. Performance management principles and practices 
give governments the ability to provide easily understood and timely 
information to the public so citizens can assess the results their 
government is producing and fulfill their role as collective owners of their 
governments.247 
The goal of accountability is to create a better product for consumers. In applying 
accountability to CI, the citizens and taxpayers get a better transportation system, a better 
use of tax money, and a safer of emergency response and evacuation system. 
The NYPD did not invent the idea of accountability, but they are one of few city 
agencies to implement it and receive the documented extreme results. The National 
Academy of Public Administration is a non-partisan, non-profit organization to “assist 
government leaders in building more effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent 
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organization.”248 Their 1991 report, Performance Monitoring and Reporting by Public 
Organization strongly recommends agency heads: 
• Monitor program quality to improve performance and credibility. 
• Implement performance monitoring. 
• Obtain agreement between policy making and operating levels. 
• Involve citizens in setting goals and monitoring results. 
• Collect data on system performance 
• Report to elected officials.249 
This 25-year-old report predates CompStat by three years and details principles similar to 
those in CompStat, yet 25 years later that system has yet to be developed for CI.  
This chapter has detailed the methodology to be used to promote CI safety via the 
mayor moving this task from under the overburdened Mayor’s Office of Operations and 
dedicating a new office to CI. This office, working with NYC EM, promotes 
communication, collaboration, and accountability to city agencies. The CompStat Unit of 
the new Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure can duplicate the advances to crime reduction 
by the NYPD’s CompStat program into NYC CI. Chapter VII stresses the importance of 
NYC CI for emergency response, evacuation, and routine travel.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Institutions parade goals and mission statements whose benevolent 
generalities discreetly obscure the conflicts and contradictions of day-to-
day activity. 
—H. W. Love250 
 
The federal government has critical infrastructure (CI) plans, reviews, and 
critiques all done by federal agencies; the New York State system has plans, but no 
reviews or critiques; and finally, the New York City system has no plans, no reviews and 
only critiques by transportation think-tanks. Concrete government-run critiques of 
agencies and follow up, currently nonexistent, must become the new model to ensure 
accountability and communication, ensuring improved CI. As one expert has noted, 
“Performance assessment and performance indicators are tools to manage with, not a 
substitute for management. They aid in decision making, not take its place.”251 
This thesis began by examining federal plans and directives; in continuing 
research, the author learned that those do not affect local municipalities, however the lack 
of plans and follow-up in those municipalities does. Documentation has shown horrifying 
information on the current state of critical infrastructure and the disasters that can occur 
as a result. Second, this thesis provided a thorough background of the CompStat system 
and its accomplishments and flaws. Third, this thesis developed a model to incorporate 
the successes of CompStat with the issues of critical infrastructure and combine them into 
a NYC Mayor’s Office of Infrastructure, following the ESF model of NYC Emergency 
Management, and begin a CompStat program to promote accountability through follow-
up and communication. 
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The topic of this thesis was developed in May 2015, while the author was stuck in 
traffic on a normal day, in Staten Island, and traffic had become a sea of impassable 
parking lots. The research began shortly after and continued through fall of 2016. While 
researching government documents, media sources, think-tank organizations reports, and 
seminars presented by the Commissioner of NYC Emergency Management and local 
elected officials, the author was unable to find a NYC office dedicated solely to 
infrastructure, but did find a theme within the NYC Mayor’s Office of Operations. A 
“theme” does not fix roads and bridges; therefore, we need a separate office to prioritize 
CI. The lack of documentation displays a need for the mayor’s office to move 
infrastructure review out from the Mayor’s Office of Operations. This is not a 
condemnation of that office, but a recommendation that critical infrastructure be 
addressed in a more direct manner. The Mayor’s Office of Operations collects and posts 
ratings of city agencies to create transparency in government, but the office is lacking in 
follow-up, communication, and accountability as recommended by this thesis. Moving 
the infrastructure theme into its own office reassures the public that the current 
administration is taking the future of CI seriously. The programs in place can be 
expanded upon to promote a brighter future for CI. 
During this research, I have been called a “pissed-off constituent” and mocked 
that I should just call my thesis “Why Do We Fill in Potholes Twice.” While all of that 
may be true, this process has informed me of the current state of CI, the unintended future 
if current systems are not improved, and how a model of accountability that changed the 
course of the NYPD and crime reduction can yield similar results in CI. This research 
was done and presented in a manner to establish a more accountable infrastructure 
partnership. Concerns are based on the current inability to leave New York City on an 
average day, thus mass evacuation would be impossible. Traffic and construction work 
cause delays in emergency response to routine police, fire, medical calls, and also to 
major events.  
The large-scale implications and interdependencies of the critical infrastructure 
system and how those relate to homeland security are important aspects to keep in mind. 
The incidents discussed are from Staten Island, the smallest borough of New York City 
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with a population of approximately 400,000 people252 and third largest in terms of square 
miles.253 These sample events are the same transportation-related issues that arise in all of 
New York City due to being overseen by the same agencies. Furthermore, the issues 
presented demonstrate processes that affect critical infrastructure and homeland security 
nationwide. While the minutia deals with road repair and bridge repair, the larger scale 
issue addresses emergency response to events and the concerns regarding evacuation of the 
city in the event of a terror-related incident or weather disaster similar to 2012’s Hurricane 
Sandy.  
Staten Island, New York City, and the United States are dealing with shrinking 
budgets and increasing repair and replacement costs. Contained in this thesis is 
documentation from agencies citing significant defects with CI in the U.S. as well as the 
associated exorbitant prices tags. Staten Island is a microcosm of NYC. The examples 
cited in this thesis are small scale but indicators of a larger problem in the lack of 
accountability and communication. Similar to the broken windows theory, we can fix 
small problems before they become larger. 
The NYPD uses the motto “do more with less” when faced with issues of 
shrinking forces. The way to do more with less is to institute policies that ensure the 
resources available are performing the correct tasks at the proper location. The CompStat 
process has contributed to a monumental crime drop, an increase in quality of life, and 
reclaiming of once war-torn neighborhoods. Executives participating in the original 
CompStats either participated and increased their responsibility level or faced 
replacement. CompStat achieved its mission of decreased crime and improved the quality 
of life by providing increased accountability. The flaws and critiques discussed were a 
small price to pay for that safety. 
The recommendations in this thesis are simple. New York City government must 
make agencies more interwoven in their responsibilities. The examples relate to some of 
                                                 
252 “Current and Projected Populations,” New York City Department of Planning, August 19, 2016, 
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/nyc-population/current-future-populations.page. 
253 “Borough (New York City),” Wikipedia, August 19, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Borough_(New_York_City). 
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the city agencies, therefore the systems proposed should begin with those and expand to 
all disciplines. Agencies track efforts on an individual, agency-based, silo-driven system. 
The proposed system for the NYC Deputy Mayor of Infrastructure and the CompStat 
Unit recommended within accomplishes three missions at once: increase accountability, 
improve communication, and promote inter-agency collaboration. 
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